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The Drive to Precarity: A Political
History of Work, Regulation, & Labor
Advocacy in San Francisco's Taxi
Uber Economies
V.B. Dubalt
This Article examines both the creation of secure work and its ongoing
demise through a critical historical and contemporary case study: over a
century of chauffeur work in San Francisco, California. Employing a
combination of historical archives and sociological research, I show how
chauffeur driving became a site of secure work for much of the twentieth
century and how this security unraveledover the course ofmany years. Since
their entre on the streets in 1909, chauffeur corporations-fromthe Taxicab
Company to Uber-underwent formative re-organizations to shift the
liabilities and responsibilitiesof business onto workers. Counterintuitively,
these changes in corporateform were met with decreased regulation and a
contractedbusiness-laborbargain. I contend that the transformationof the
corporate form, the shrinking bargain, and the rejoinders of the state
triangulatedto produce worker risk and weaken the relationship between
work and security.
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PartI of this Article describeshow militant laboradvocacy transformed
taxi driving from precariousto secure work in the earliest decades of the
twentieth century by compelling municipal regulation and using collective
power to shape the business model. PartII explains how by the 1970s, legal
decisions to withdraw from the business-labor bargain combined with
politicaland racialdiscontent among rank-and-fileworkers set the stagefor
the complete decline of union power. PartIII then tells the post-union story.
In the following three decades, even without official bargainingpower,
worker advocates leveraged municipal regulation to exert minimal control
over wages and working conditions. The impact of these tactics, however,
was both limited and shapedby the possibilitiesand constraintsofwork law.
Finally, Part IV turns to the current Uber era and details the course of
industry deregulationand labor'sresponse to the reproductionofrisky, early
2 0th

century working conditions.

As the "Uber economy" model rapidly expands into other spheres of
service work, I maintain that the politicalhistory of how chauffeur work went
from precarity to security and back may hold important lessons for
contemporary laborstruggles.
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INTRODUCTION

The contemporary growth of uncertain, risk-laden work in the United
States constitutes a central social, political, and economic concern. By some
estimates, more than one-third of the workforce today is made up of
"contingent" workers-temporary workers, contract workers, and part-time
workers who labor outside the boundaries of traditional employment
protections.' These workers live precarious lives, facing increased job
insecurity, higher rates of occupational injuries and illnesses, and lower
wages, among other difficulties.2
How did we get here? Academics across disciplines have blamed the
growth of risky or precarious work on the "fissured workplace"' and the

1.

The number of contingent workers laboring in the United States is a subject of some contention.

See Chris Opfer, Gig Workforce Estimates Still in Question, BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY LABOR REPORT

(Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.bna.com/gig-workforce-estimates-n57982078231/. A 2016 study conducted
by the Freelancers' Union and UpWork estimates that 55 million workers, or 35% of the U.S. workforce,
labors in the "freelance economy." This includes workers who are independent contractors, workers with
multiple sources of income, moonlighters, freelance business owners, and temporary workers. See
FREELANCERS UNION & UPWORK, FREELANCING IN AMERICA: 2016 (2016), http://src.bna.com/jdW.
2. "Studies in the U.S. and Europe suggest that contingent workers such as part-time, temporary,
or contract workers are at higher risk for occupational injuries and illnesses than workers in traditional
employment situations." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Studies Suggest Higher
Risk for Contingent Workers than in TraditionalEmployment, NIOSH Researchers Report (Feb. 5, 2008),

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/updates/upd-02-05-08.html.
3. Economist David Weil coined the term the "fissured workplace." In his seminal book by the
same name, Weil argues that in sharp contrast to much of the twentieth century, contemporary

employment is fissured, meaning businesses no longer directly employ workers to make products or
deliver services, but rather transfer those responsibilities to a "complicated network of smaller business
units." DAVID WElL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (Harvard University Press 2014).
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"Uberization"4 of the economy.' In this narrative, the prevalence of
precarious work today can be attributed to shifting business models
introduced in the 1970s, bent on circumventing liability and evading New
and post-New Deal employment protections in order to streamline production
and maximize profits.6 Today, most large businesses, as economist David
Weil points out, no longer employ workers but instead "transfer[] work to a
complicated network of smaller units," where responsibility for workers
becomes murky.7 Other companies, most notoriously in the "gig" economy,
in janitorial services, and in construction, engage workers directly but
position them as contractors-individual small businesses responsible to and
for themselves.
In the history of U.S.-based paid work', however, precarity has been the
norm, not the exception. When we consider precarious work today, we draw
an implicit comparison to an exceptional period of three to four previous
decades of secure work. As Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore point out,
these mid-twentieth century decades are a standout from the otherwise
consistent trajectory of unprotected, risky paid work.9 Accounts that explain

4.
In his book, Raw Deal: How the Uber Economy and Runaway Capitalism Are Screwing
American Workers, journalist Steven Hill argues that the United States workforce is undergoing a
transformation, epitomized by Uber's business model, in which workers are converted to freelancers,
temps, and contractors. Steven Hill, RAW DEAL: HOW THE "UBER ECONOMY" AND RUNAWAY
CAPITALISM ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS (2015). In recent literature on contingent work, some

academics have used the term "uberization" to describe business models that shift the risks and
responsibilities of businesses onto the backs of workers while simultaneously depriving those workers of
the protections of employment and labor law. See, e.g., Daniel P Bearth, Uberization of Trucking,
TRANSPORT TOPiCS (2015); David Theo Goldberg, Coming to You Soon: Uber U, INSIDE HIGHER ED,

Aug.

12,

2016,

https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2016/08/12/dangers-uberization-higher-

education-essay.
5.
The literature on precarity abounds across disciplines. I use the term here to mean work that is,
from the perspective of the worker, insecure and risk-laden. My use of the term is primarily informed by
the following works: Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in
Transition, 74 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 1 (2009); ANDREW ROSS, NICE WORK IF YOU CAN GET
IT: LIFE AND LABOR IN PRECARIOUS TIMES (NYU Press 2009); GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE
NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (Bloomsbury Academic 2011).
6.
In another article, I describe how these business models were enabled in the transportation

industry by legal decisions subverting the right to collectively bargain to the business decisions of taxi
companies. See V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker

Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2017).
7. Weil, supra note 3, at 8.
8.

1 use the term "paid work" to mean free labor that was performed in exchange for a wage or

commission and that is distinguishable from slavery, indentured servitude, and unpaid domestic labor.
9.

Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore argue that "[i]t was an extraordinary moment, a singular

period in US history, in which all the key factors fell into place to create the New Deal order." They
maintain that this was produced by, among other things, two central transformations: new union leadership
that included (at times) women and African Americans and the role of government in actively supporting
working people. In their terms, the New Deal era was a "rare moment in the long struggle of organized
labor when unions won-and won big. . ." Jefferson Cowie & Nick Salvatore, Scholarly Controversy:
Rethinking The PlaceOf The New Deal In American History, 74 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 1,
7 (2008).

2017]

THE DRIVE TO PRECARITY

77

contemporary insecurity through business models alone overlook the
distinctiveness of this relatively brief period. To understand and, more
critically, to address the predicament of work and workers today, we must
go beyond our investigation of present day precarity and also investigate
what produced the exceptional years of security preceding it.
This Article examines both the creation of secure work and its ongoing
0
demise through a critical historical and contemporary case study' : over a
century of chauffeur work in San Francisco, California." This case study is
significant because of the site (San Francisco) and the work examined
(chauffeur driving). San Francisco is home to both one of the oldest and most
robustly regulated taxi industries in the country and to the Transportation
Network Company (TNC) start-ups Uber and Lyft.12 The TNCs-as second
generation, algorithmically-enabled chauffeur companies-have sparked the
imagination of entrepreneurs and investors, spawning a global economy of
contractor-centered technology businesses bent on "disrupting" traditional
models of work. But the remunerative realities of chauffeur driving in San
Francisco's taxi and TNC industries belie the fervor behind this phenomenon.
Chauffeur workers today, many of whom are immigrants and racial
minorities for whom full-time wage work is unavailable, struggle under the
business models of the taxi and TNC industries, driving long hours for little
pay.13

10. In addition to the historical research, my San Francisco case study is informed by over two
years of ethnographic research in the San Francisco taxi industry and over one year of ethnographic and
interview-based research amongst San Francisco Bay Area Uber drivers. My ethnographic research of
the San Francisco taxi industry, which took place between 2010 and 2013, incorporates over one thousand
hours of participant observation at regulatory meetings, taxi worker advocacy meetings, and other places
where taxi workers frequently convene, like the San Francisco International Airport holding lot. This
research also comprises data from forty-five in-depth interviews of taxi workers. My ethnographic and
qualitative research of Uber drivers in the Bay Area is ongoing but began substantively in 2015. This
includes hundreds of hours of observation of Uber drivers in organizing meetings, fifteen in-depth
interviews of Uber drivers, over 250 Uber driver surveys, and extensive review of legal complaints against
Uber and regulatory debates and decisions regarding Uber and Transportation Network Companies
(TNCs) across U.S. cities and states. Much of the regulatory research was conducted as part of a larger
project investigating the politics of Uber regulation; this project is being conducted with Professor Ruth
Collier and Christopher Carter, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley.
Although the term "chauffeur" is an outmoded way to refer to a taxi or Uber driver, I draw on
11.
its historic implications to connect the actual work done across time and to underscore the degree of
hierarchy present in the job. For example, although Transportation Network Company (TNC) work was
originally represented as "peer to peer," the power dynamic between the driver and the rider belies this
description. The TNC driver is performing a service for the rider, whose rating of that driver, in the Uber
context, can induce driver "perks" or lead to termination. While the driver can also rate the rider, his or
her rating has no consequence on the ability of the rider to make a living. See supra note 10.
12. For a more extensive discussion of the Transportation Network Company phenomenon, see
Section IV.
13. Contemporary chauffeur workers-both taxi and Uber drivers-labor under a business model
that does not guarantee them a minimum wage. In most cities, taxi workers pay to work. Uber drivers,
too, bear all the costs of business-wear and tear on their cars, payments for their smartphones, gas, and
insurance-and suffer from low, unpredictable, company-determined rates. In both contexts, competition
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Chauffeur work was not always so precarious. Between the 1920s and
the 1970s, taxi driving across the United States was regulated, union work.
Drivers worked full-time, but not over-time, earned a "living wage,"l 4 and
enjoyed the dignities of work and a political voice alongside their union
brothers. In this Article, I tell the important, but forgotten, story of how taxi
work became secure. I also trace how this security slowly fell apart.
Contrary to accounts that attribute the origins of precarity to a decisive
moment in the 1970s, a close historical examination of the chauffeur industry
in San Francisco suggests that the demise of secure work may have been
slower, building over a series of many years through the triangulated
decisions of businesses, regulators, and labor leaders.
Centrally, the case study of the San Francisco chauffeur industry
illustrates that work was decoupled from security over the course of two
critical decades. This began in the 1950s through both the declining
willingness of state actors to robustly regulate the industry and later, by rising
racial and political conflicts between the Union and its members. It was then
exacerbated in the late 1970s by corporate corruption and successful attempts
of businesses to evade work laws. The combined results of these decades
impacted the Union's contracting bargain. Over the course of a century, labor
steadily regressed from leveraging militant tactics to attain a bargain on
behalf of "the social good;" to employing cooperation with business in the
negotiation of a moderate bargain; to losing the business-labor bargain but
maintaining a just wage through regulation; to ultimately, in the Uber
context, losing regulatory leverage and control over wages and settling for
market-based benefits and workplace voice."

via the onset of an unregulated number of TNC vehicles makes earning a living even more difficult. See
supra note 10. In another Article, I discuss how and why immigrant and racial minorities are pushed into
and/or drawn to this type of work and how they are carved out of more secure wage work. See Dubal,
supra note 6.
14. Lawrence Glickman traces the use of the "living wage" to an era between the Civil War and
the 1930s. LAWRENCE B GLICKMAN, A LIvING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF

CONSUMER SOCIETY (Cornell University Press 1999). Through an analysis of the history of the living
wage, Glickman documents the shift to wage labor. He argues, "At the beginning of this period few
workers could countenance a lifetime of working for wages; at the end, very few could imagine anything
else." Id. at 4. Notably, while the term 'living wages' was initially ambiguous, by the early 20' century,
it connoted wages that provided not just minimal economic security but also enabled wage laborers to act
as consumers. Id. at 5, 68-95.
15. As I discuss in Section IV, most unions and alt labor groups that have attempted to represent
TNC drivers have done so outside of the traditional collective bargaining context. Because TNC drivers
have not been legally determined to be employees under the National Labor Relations Act, any attempt at
collective bargaining over wages risks antitrust liability. National Labor Relations Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. §
152 (1978). To evade this, unions and alt labor groups have advocated for worker benefits that do not
involve the state (e.g., in lieu of pension benefits, they have worked towards 401k plans with no corporate
contribution) and for "worker voice" through associations that have no bargaining power. For more on
this, see Section IV. Notably, these associations are reminiscent of Employee Representation Plans (ERPs)
introduced in a range of industries in the United States during World War I. Empirical evidence suggests
that ERPs were a "union avoidance device" and undermined the recognition of unions as bargaining
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TABLE 1: WORKER STATUS, THE BUSINESS-LABOR BARGAIN,
& REGULATION OF THE SAN FRANcISco CHAUFFEUR INDUSTRY

Labor Rep

Labor Bargain

Regulation

Employees with
Commission to
Employees with a
Guaranteed Wage

Chauffeurs'
Union

Political Bargain:
For Social Good

No
Regulation to

Employees with a
Guaranteed Wage

Chauffeurs'
Union

Worker Status
Taxi
1909-1950

Taxi
1950-1979

High
Regulation

Moderate
Bargain: For a

Sustained
Regulation

Secure Wage

Contractors with
no Guaranteed
Wage

Uber

Independent

2013-prmt Contractors with

no Guaranteed
Wage

United
Taxicab
Workers

Barely a Bargain:

Teamsters

Illusory Bargain:
For Portable
Benefits
Workplace Voice

For a Just Wage
(subsistence value
for work)

Silicon Valley
6
Rising(?)'

Decreased
Regulation

Deregulation

&

Independent

1979-2013

&

Taxi

What do I mean that labor leaders in the earliest days of the chauffeur
industry bargained on behalf of "the social good"? In the post-National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) era, the declining role of labor unions is
conceptualized through the lens of collective bargaining, which is restricted
to contractual negotiations for collective wage and job security between the
employer and the union. In Part I of this Article, however, I describe the preNLRA character of the Chauffeurs' Union's bargain. Fighting for the leisure
value of work, the Union negotiated a contract with taxi companies, and also,
using their bargain as an instrument, influenced the tone of business and
politics. In those early twentieth century decades, the Chauffeurs' Union
shaped business models, set prices, and effected public policy, establishing
strong municipal regulation of a once unregulated industry.
In Part II, I tell the story of how after decades of sustained regulation,
the Union's grip became more slippery. This, I argue, was influenced by two
major factors: (1) legal and legislative decisions made in the 1950s that
sought to subdue labor and reflected a reluctance to intercede in the business-

agents. Greg Patmore, Unionism and Non-Union Employee Representation: The Interwar Experience in
Canada, Germany, the US and the UK, 55 J. OF INDUS. REL. 527 (2013).
16

As I discuss in Section IV, whether the Teamsters and Silicon Valley Rising will continue to

work towards creating a "worker association" of Uber drivers remains unclear.
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labor contract," and (2) the political and racial politics of the Union in the
1960s and 1970s.'" Those years set the stage for the following, wellrecognized era of rising precarity. The combination of corporate corruption
and taxi firm restructuring in the late 1970s completed the transformation of
the taxi industry. After the city's largest taxi company, Yellow Cab, went
bankrupt, it re-opened utilizing a new business model: leasing. Under the
leasing system, San Francisco taxi companies created jobs in which drivers,
for the first time, paid to work." Rather than providing a daily wage or
commission, the firms rented taxis to drivers for a fixed rate and thus turned
directly to the workers for their source of profit. The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) determined that these drivers were independent
contractors, and the Union lost the right to collectively bargain on their
behalf.
In Part III, I describe how the following three decades (from the 1980s
to the late 2000s) saw a limited semblance of work stability in the San
Francisco taxi industry. Highly engaged worker activists created and
sustained a non-union worker group-the United Taxicab Workers (UTW)and utilized continuing regulation of the industry to maintain fragile control
over wages and working conditions. Nevertheless, the potential militancy of
de-unionized activism was constrained by the illusory possibilities of labor
law. Instead of employing tactics to organize workers and achieve labor
power, the UTW devoted enormous amounts of energy to attempts to re-gain
employment status under the National Labor Relations Act, attempts which
ultimately failed. Still, while labor advocates had lost the ability to bargain
directly with taxi companies, they continued to bargain over wages and
working conditions with municipal regulators.
Finally, in Part IV, I turn to the history and politics of the contemporary
Uber era.
The 2008-9 Great Recession resulted in high rates of
unemployment and the loss of many full-time jobs. In this desperate
economic and political environment, Transportation Network Companies
(TNCs) were born. As an additional regression from once secure,
professional chauffeur work, the TNCs disrupted a century of municipal
regulations that workers had leveraged for their security. Chauffeur workers

17. In his illuminating book, legal historian Reuel Schiller describes the decline of labor as the
result of a postwar "forging" of the commitment to protect the civil rights of racial minorities and the
minimizing of government involvement in the relationship between labor and management. Reuel
Schiller, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR LIBERALISM 40-41
(2015).
18.
Labor historians Cowie and Salvatore argue that the New Deal itself contained a "web of
internal fractures," which, when stressed decades later, "broke open." Cowie & Salvatore, supra note 9
at 5. Key among these fractures was an inconsistent commitment to racial equality. Id. at 9.
19.
In the "gas and gates" system, drivers pay a lease fee, most frequently for a ten-hour shift, to
take the taxi and work for fares. The taxi company pays for commercial insurance and car upkeep while
the driver pays for gas. Supra note 10.
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no longer just leased taxis from firms. Instead, many invested their own
capital-including cars, smart phones, insurance, and gasoline-to become
chauffeur drivers. Uber, the TNC with the most drivers and riders, claimed
to be a technology company rather than a taxi company, thereby placing legal
and financial risk and responsibility on its independent contractor driver
"partners." 2 0 In a counterintuitive response to this heightened state of worker
precarity, San Francisco municipal and California state regulators almost
completely deregulated the industry.21 These decisions, which relied on the
promise of innovation, drew the ire of the labor community. But given the
difficulties of organizing atomized, contingent workers and the looming fear
of anti-trust liability, most unions declined to advance the cause of this new
generation of chauffeur workers. Some that did exchanged the fight for job
and wage security for a "bargain" consisting of workplace voice and marketbased benefits.
Through a historical and political account of these four epochs of
chauffeur work, this Article analyzes how the shifting positions and tactics
of businesses, labor representatives, and municipal regulators dramatically
transformed an industry, producing secure, regulated work and then
gradually unraveling it. In the Conclusion, I use this century of labor and
regulation history to return to the contemporary political and economic
ramifications of these major shifts. I argue that by closely examining how
chauffeur work became secure and how that security subsequently eroded,
we may find insight to inform contemporary struggles for stable work.

20. While taxi companies, too, claimed that their workers were independent contractors, most
TNCs take it one step further. For example, in the case of car accidents, the taxi companies assumed
liability and carried commercial insurance to that end. See supra note 10. In contrast, when a six-year old
girl, Sophia Liu, was killed by an Uber driver in late 2013, Uber disclaimed responsibility, arguing in
court filings that it was not a transportation company, but a technology company, and therefore should not
bear responsibility for the Uber driver's negligence. See John Constine, Uber 's Denial ofLiability in Girl's
2014),
(Jan.
2,
Death Raises Accident Accountability Questions, TECHCRUNCH
https://techcrunch.com/2014/01/02/should-car-services-provide-insurance-whenever-their-driver-app-isopen/; see also Bay City News, Family of 6-Year-Old Girl Killed by Uber DriverSettles Lawsuit, ABC7
NEWS (July 14, 2015), http://abc7news.com/business/family-of-6-year-old-girl-killed-by-uber-driversettles-lawsuit/852108/; see also Patrick Hoge, Dead Girl's Family Sues Uber, SAN FRANCISCO Bus.
TIMEs (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.bizjoumals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2014/01/uber-lyft-sidecar-sofialiu-dolan.html.
21. San Francisco imposed a single regulatory burden on Uber, and that burden fell on the drivers
who were forced, if they believed they were independent contractors, to pay for business licenses to
operate in the city. See Carolyn Said, Uber, Lyft Drivers Preparefor SF Business License Crackdown,
S.F. CHRON., (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Uber-Lyft-drivers-preparefor-SF-business-7294676.php. Similarly, the rules eventually promulgated by the California Public
Utilities Commission were primarily directed at drivers, not the company. Regulations on the number of
TNCs allowed to operate and on fare rates were noticeably absent. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
Rulemaking 12-12-011, DecisionAdopting Rules and Regulationsto ProtectPublicSafety While Allowing
2013),
23,
(Sept.
72-73
at
Transportation Industry,
the
Entrants to
New
77
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/GOOO/MO /Kl 92/77192335.PDF.
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I.
MAKING WORK PAY: MILITANT TAXI LABOR & ROBUST MUNICIPAL

REGULATION, 1909-1934

When they first appeared on the streets of San Francisco circa 1906
replacing hackneys (or horse-drawn carriages for hire), taxicabs were
privately-owned, unregulated vehicles operated by a non-unionized
workforce. By 1913, however, taxis were a regulated "semi-public utility";
by 1918, taxi companies guaranteed a wage and a limited workday; and by
1919, 100% of the workforce was unionized.22 While taxi companies and
workers in most cities during the Great Depression experienced difficult
economic instability, in San Francisco wages remained relatively stable, due
in large part to early municipal regulation and high rates of unionization.2 3
How did this precarious, unregulated industry become a site of secure work
during such a volatile economic moment in national history?
Using newspaper accounts, labor archives, and personal records, this
section examines the San Francisco taxi industry in its nascent years.2 4 The
first taxi company business model was strikingly similar to the business
models of TNCs in the contemporary taxi economy. Based on an unregulated

and commission-based business model, these early taxicab companies
produced precarious work with long hours and an unpredictable income.
Companies provided drivers with automobiles, paid a 20% commission (not
a guaranteed wage), and demanded that workers pay for gasoline. 25 But
strategic decisions by union leaders to use militant tactics to fight for an
expansive bargain and robust municipal regulation of the industry soon

changed that. A decade after taxicab companies opened their doors, taxi
driving became a site of stable and secure work.
To achieve desirable working conditions, the Chauffeurs' Union fought
for and won a politicized bargain that triangulated the interests of workers,
consumers, and the state. The Union embraced a political campaign to
22.

CHAUFFEURS' MAGAZINE (1919) (on file with author).
23. Nationally, the Great Depression decimated the taxi industry. "[T]he number of taxicabs
skyrocketed, while occupancy rates and revenue per taxi declined," resulting in low revenue for companies
and untenable working conditions for drivers. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation,
Deregulation, and Reregulation: the ParadoxofMarket Failure, 24 TRANSPORTATION LAW JOURNAL 73
(1996).
24. These archives draw from personal and union records housed at the San Francisco State
University Labor Archives and a century of taxi and labor related newspaper clippings housed at the San
Francisco History Center.
25.
This part of the old taxicab company business model is distinct from the TNC business model
today. The biggest difference is that today workers must invest substantial amounts of their own capital
and provide the instrument for labor-their vehicle. Supra note 10. The TNC companies often facilitate
this purchase or lease through their subsidiaries. Id. For a detailed account of how these car purchases
and leases place greater financial risk and burden on the backs of workers, see Sarah Leberstein, Uber 's
Car Leasing Programs Turns Its Drivers into Modern Day Sharecroppers, QUARTZ (June 6, 2016),
http://qz.com/700473/ubers-car-leasing-program-tums-its-drivers-into-modem-day-sharecroppers/.
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influence overall economic policy for the San Francisco taxi industry. They
expanded their influence far beyond that of workers' wages and hours,
ensuring that leisure, dignity, and consumer interests were part of the bargain.
For example, rather than fighting for better wages within the boundaries of
the business model established by the taxicab companies, the Chauffeurs'
Union leveraged consumer regulatory intervention together with direct action
to re-shape the business model of taxicab companies in San Francisco. In
doing so, the Union not only secured better wages and working conditions
for taxi workers, but also garnered a great deal of power over the industry,
guaranteeing that workers had a voice in business and regulatory decisions.
The Chauffeurs' Union and the PoliticizedBargain:Setting the
Wage and the Price

A.

On October 6, 1909, labor activists founded the Chauffeurs' Union
Local 265 to represent taxi, limousine, and funeral drivers, among other
transportation craft workers in San Francisco. 26 The Chauffeurs' Union was
affiliated with the San Francisco Labor Council, Joint Council of Teamsters,
the California State Federation of Labor, and the International Union. Less
than ten years after its founding under the leadership of taxi driver and
business agent S.T. Dixon, the Union achieved 100% representation of taxi
workers. 27 By 1919, sixteen years before the Wagner Act was passed, the
Chauffeurs' Union represented all of San Francisco's 500 taxi drivers, the
majority of whom were veterans of World War 1.28
S.T. Dixon, referred to in labor leaflets as "The Man at the Wheel," was
viewed by critics as a "red" and "radical" and often found himself in conflict
29
with more moderate San Francisco labor leaders. Although he emphatically
denied communist affiliation, Dixon openly sought to make labor "more
effective and more militant," repudiating the principles and policies of the
30
American Federation of Labor as too "conservative" and "reactionary."
Under Dixon's strident leadership, the Chauffeurs' Union focused on direct
action, calling frequent strikes and exercising intolerance (sometimes in the
form of violence) towards non-union workers. In sharp contrast to his labor

Labor News, S.F. BULL., (July 13, 1911); see Election of Officers, San Francisco Labor
26.
Council, CharacterSummary of ST. Dixon, (profiling Dixon for president of the Chauffeurs' Union)

(Jan. 20, 1920) (on file with author). Note the Chauffeurs' Union succeeded the old union of hackmen,
"an established institution of San Francisco's early days." CHAUFFEURS' MAGAZINE (1919) (on file with

author). The Union building, which served as both a social and political hub for taxi workers, was
headquartered in the K. of P. building at Valencia and McCoppin, in the heart of what is now San

Francisco's Castro District. The space housed clubrooms, reading rooms, officers' halls, and meeting halls
for its members. Id.
27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Frederick W. Ely, Bitter Rivalry in S.F. Labor Campaign (on file with author).

30.

Id.
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contemporaries, Dixon believed that the state should play an active role i:
securingjust working conditions and called for municipal intervention in th
industry.

"

Within just ten months of assuming~ the position of business agent, S T
D)ixon successfully led taxi workers at San Francisco's largest cab compan'
on their first strike. Considerinig the difficulties of convincing workers ti
stop earning to engage in direct action-to voluntarily make their livelihood
vulnerable- the short lime period in which Dixon orchestrated this stik
w as a reniarkable feat. In November 1910, San Francisco taxi driv ers struel
fori three weeks arid demanded free gasoline and a twelve-hour workday
Their demands were initially rebuffed by the T axicab C ompanv o
California." T he strike was endorsed by the San Francisco Labor Conicil
the Joint Council of Tecamsters, and the International Brotherhood o
Teamsters, arid was broadly supported by workers throughout the industry.
it lasted for three weeks and successfully established a twelve-hour workda
md free gasoline with a secure commission of 20%
But obtaining a secure commission and limited workday was iust thn
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the support of the workforce and securing a contract, the Union strategized
to leverage local regulation to achieve a more politicized bargain. While
most labor leaders of the day feared government intervention, Dixon saw the
city's regulatory foray into consumer legislation of the taxi industry as an
important opportunity for workers.34 Union contracts only offered security
until the expiry of the contract, at which point wages and hours had to be renegotiated. Government regulation had the potential to ensure the stability
of working conditions indefinitely.
Soon enough, the opportunity arose to lobby municipal leaders and bring
them into the relations between taxicab owners and workers. In 1912, the
city of San Francisco sought to define "taxicab" in local law, emphasizing
the importance of the taxi meter.35 The next year, due to concerns over
consumer safety and price gouging, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
passed an ordinance giving the city power to regulate charges for taxi
service.36 After much debate, the Supervisors set the maximum taxi fare at
"seventy-five cents for one or two passengers without baggage."" Notably,
fare-setting in San Francisco began fifteen years before municipalities
elsewhere in the country began to consider taxi industry regulation.
While the fare ordinance was intended to protect consumers who were
ostensibly facing erratic prices, the Chauffeurs' Union used the regulation to
attain a set wage for workers. Until then, the commission-based system of
payment had resulted in unreliable wages for drivers. The hourly rate was
variable and too often very low. The Chauffeurs' Union used this fare
ordinance as an entrde into publicizing the inequities embedded in the
commission-based system. In particular, Dixon argued that the seventy-five

34.

Why were labor leaders during this era worried about government intervention? As William

Forbath explains, by the early 1900s, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) leaders "had embraced a
rigid anti-statist liberalism." WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR

MOVEMENT 130 (1991). Samuel Gompers, the leader of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and
other national labor leaders were concerned that empowering the state to involve itself in labor relations

would result in the state crushing the freedom of labor to express collective will. And indeed, the state's
primary role in business-labor relations during this period was through the issuance of one-sided
injunctions to obstruct work stoppages. To fight state repression, the AFL strategically accepted the idea
of freedom of contract and insisted that such a freedom necessitated that the state avoid judicial
interventions in protests and work stoppages. Id. at 130-35. The route taken by S.T. Dixon and the
Chauffeurs' Union-to encourage state intervention in the business-labor bargain-was thus highly
unconventional for the era.
The ordinance read, "The term taxicab, whenever used in this ordinance, shall be held to
35.
embrace and means all motor vehicles propelled by power other than muscular, the rental for which is
computed for the distance traveled by means of a taximeter attached thereto. . . ." Taxicab Defined, 1912

(on file with author).
36. Note that the Board of Supervisors in San Francisco is equivalent to the City Council in most
cities. The unique title is attributed to the fact that San Francisco is both a city and a county.
37.

Taxi Men Laugh at Ordinance, S.F. BULLETIN, 1913 (on file with author).

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

86

Vol. 38:1

cents fare was untenable for the commissioned taxi workers.38 He explained,
"The drivers can't make a living without tips . . . if a driver gets a fair wage

at the end of the week it is because of the tips he has received." 39 Dixon
testified in a municipal hearing that because of the commission system and
despite the twelve-hour union contract, taxi workers were working up to
eighteen-hour days.40 Those working the longest hours were bringing in an
average of $3.75 per day, and some made only $6-$7 per week.4 1 The new
ordinance, he argued, would exacerbate the situation unless the business
model of the taxi companies changed from commission-based earnings to
secure wages.4 2
Having planted the seed, the following year, the Chauffeurs' Union built
on driver outrage over the ordinance to launch a multi-year campaign against
commission-based earnings in favor of a stipulated wage for all drivers.43
Four years later, in September 1918, the Chauffeurs' Union finally won this
campaign. At the same time, the Union succeeded in attaining 100%
representation through the unionization of two of the largest firms in the
taxicab business. Together, the aggressive direct actions and municipal
advocacy forced the taxi companies to alter their business model. The taxi
industry shifted from a commission-based, split-shift system that coerced
drivers to work sixteen, eighteen, or even twenty hours a day to a guaranteed
daily wage of $4 for a ten-hour shift. Newspaper reports specified,
"[M] embers feel exceedingly grateful to Dixon, who organized the union and
piloted it to success." 44
The fare ordinance and the memory of the 1910 strike motivated the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors to formally shift their role in the taxi
industry, calling it a "semi-public utility" to justify government intervention
into the contract between businesses and workers.45 The Supervisors argued
that since the city set the taxi fare and the taxicab companies' stands were on

38.
According to undercover newspaper reporters, union drivers uniformly charged $1, in active
disobedience of the new ordinance. See id; see also Taxicab Charges to Be FixedSoon, S.F. CHRON., Apr.

27, 1912.
39.

See Taxi Men Laugh at Ordinance, supra note 37.
See Taxicab Chargesto Be Fixed Soon, supra note 38.
41.
Id. As per the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index inflation calculator, $6-$7 in
1913 amounts to approximately $146.32-$170.71 in 2016. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB.
40.

STAT. (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation-calculator.htm.
42.

Id.

43.

See, e.g., Frederick W. Ely, To Pay Wage Instead of Commission, Mar. 5, 1914 (on file with

author).

44.

Chauffeurs' Victory, Sept. 17, 1918 (on file with author).

45.

At this historical moment, whether taxis could be regulated as "common carriers" under the

common law was still a matter of debate. By 1917, at least two courts in West Virginia and Missouri had
decided that they were. But in San Francisco in 1910, regulators found other reasons to justify their
intervention into industry. Edwin R Keedy, Note, Is a Taxicab Company a Common Carrier?,66 U. PA.

L. REv. 71 (1917).
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public property, they had the right to have a say in labor relations to prevent
another strike.46 Six years after the passage of the fare ordinance, city
regulators publically advocated for higher wages for drivers. Specifically,
the Supervisors suggested raising the taxi fare rates and granting drivers a
raise from this increase in fare price. Taxicab company representatives turned
down the offer, fearful that ridership would decrease if rates increased and
weary of the new alliance between municipal leaders and union leaders.4 7 But
within two days of a taxi drivers' strike and under pressure from both workers
and the City, the taxi companies gave in to the Supervisors' suggestions. On
October 1, 1919, the taxicab companies agreed to the Union's demands for a
daily wage of $5 and an eight-hour workday.4 8
Ten years after its founding, the Chauffeurs' Union had succeeded in
using municipal lobbying and strike tactics to drastically alter the nature of
the San Francisco taxi industry-transforming it from a completely private
enterprise to a "semi-public" utility. The Union exerted influence over not
just the wages of workers, but also the price of the product and the way in
which the taxi companies made their profits. However, this politicized
bargain-triangulated among workers, companies, and the city-was soon
challenged by the American Plan: local and national efforts by businesses to
challenge union power.
B. Taxicab CompaniesStrike Back: A Four-YearRefusal to Bargain
In 1922, three years after the Chauffeurs' Union won a stipulated $5
wage for workers, the workers' contract expired and taxicab companies
began a multi-year "war" against the Chauffeurs' Union. Adopting the
politics of the American Plan-a national policy adopted by U.S. businesses
in the 1920s to stamp out unions by refusing to bargain-the cab companies
rejected all compromises proposed by the Union.49 The Union countered
with a strike and violence against American Plan (or "scab") drivers. In
response, the taxicab companies took strikers to court, determined to de-

46. City to Try to Halt Strike of TaxicabDrivers, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 28, 1919. A local newspaper
reported, "The fact that the supervisors have passed ordinances governing rates to be charged in the hotel
and other sections of the city, and the fact that most of the large companies are extended many favors in
the matter of stands along the streets and squares, the supervisors believe gives them the right to have a
voice in the matter." Id.
47.

Id.
48.
Taxi Drivers Win Battlefor $5 Wage: Demandfor Eight-Hour Day Also Unconditionally
Grantedby the Auto Owners'Association,S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 2, 1919. S.T. Dixon declared the outcome
a "complete victory" for taxi drivers but agreed to sign an agreement to go before the Board of Supervisors

and ask authority to increase taxicab rates. This was a compromise as the riding public could then place
the blame for higher fares on the drivers, and not on the businesses. Taxi Men Return to Work, 1919 (on

file with author).
49.

See generally Allen M. Wakstein, The National Association of Manufacturers and Labor

Relations in the 1920s, 10 LAB. HIST. 163 (1969) (discussing the American Plan).
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unionize the industry at all costs."o These long and violent years threatened
the power of the Chauffeurs' Union and their politicized bargain. However,
by continuing to use radical tactics to bring drivers into the fold, the
Chauffeurs' Union and the bargain it established survived.
The war against the Union began when the companies demanded that
the Chauffeurs' Union agree to lower drivers' wages to $4 per day, a 20%
wage decrease from the previous contract."' The Union countered that they
would accept $4.50 per day. The companies, as per the philosophy of the
American Plan, refused. After both sides failed to reach an agreement, the
550 taxi drivers of San Francisco voted for a strike on May 5, 1922.
But San Francisco taxicab companies, seasoned by previous strikes and
emboldened by the nationwide, concerted efforts of business to eliminate
collective bargaining, launched an all-out attack against the Union. They
aggressively advertised a need for "strike condition" drivers in the San
FranciscoExaminer for a full week before the union vote to strike. These
"strike condition" drivers were promised compensation, above and beyond
the union contract demands-$5 per day plus room and board. By paying
strike condition drivers more than the Union was demanding, the companies
made clear that their refusal to bargain was not based on their economic
realities, but rather on an effort to stamp out the power of the Union.52 The
battle with the two largest companies-Yellow Cab and Black and White
Cab-continued for over three years, with both companies replacing drivers
on strike with non-union replacements.
The scale and level of violence resulting from the strike are hard to
imagine by contemporary standards." Riots broke out in the streets, and men
on both sides were physically attacked. Within the first three weeks of the
strike, taxicab companies alleged that the strike had caused $20,000 of
damage on their properties.54 W.E. Travis, president of the taxicab company
association, began a publicity assault on the Union alleging that "the striking
drivers set out to win the strike by violence.

.

. committ[ing] . . . battery,

arson, and assault with intent to kill."" Newspaper accounts corroborated
the level of violence alleged by Travis but indicated that such violence
50.

Taxi Strikers Enjoined by Court Order, S.F. EXAMINER, May 13, 1922.

51.

Chauffeurs Vote to Call Strike Today, S.F. EXAMINER, May 5, 1922.
52.
Within days after the strike began, several smaller companies that could not absorb the
economic losses from the strike reached an agreement with the Chauffeurs' Union. By February 1923,

Checker Cab Company reached a two-year agreement with the Union, succumbing to the wage demand
for $4.50 per day. Company Ends Taxicab Strike: Only Two Concerns in S.F. Now Holding Out. Feb. 3,
1923 (on file with author).
53. On October 2, 1922, newspaper headlines called a street fight a "riot" as, "[h]ostilities in San
Francisco's taxicab war broke forth anew . .. when more than a score of drivers andsympathizers engaged
in a free-for-all battle at Powell and O'Farrell streets, which resulted in a general riot call for the police."

Riot Marks New Outbreak in Taxi War Oct. 2, 1922 (emphasis added) (on file with author).
54.

Taxi Strikers Enjoined by CourtOrder, S.F. EXAMINER, May 13, 1922.

55.

Id.
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occurred on both sides. Courts ignored the violence instigated by the
companies, but enjoined the Chauffeurs' Union from using force." S.T.
Dixon was arrested and charged with conspiracy to assault non-union taxicab
drivers and with possession of a concealed weapon. Those charges were later
dropped.
But during these difficult American Plan years, many union leaders,
Dixon included, focused not just on discouraging potential scabs, but also on
bringing them into the fold. With the knowledge that their remarkable power
was rooted in their numbers, the Chauffeurs' Union by 1923 had returned to
the difficult job of organizing. In August 1925, more than one hundred new
taxi drivers (former "scabs") were admitted into the Union, and S.T. Dixon
informed the media that he expected complete unionization of the craft within
a week under the Union's new open charter.57 To facilitate this rapid
unionization, the Union admission fee was reduced to $1 and applicants were
admitted without formal initiation.
The organizing focus and tactics worked, and only five months later the
"Taxicab War" ended, culminating in a four-year union contract with Yellow
Taxicab Company. This contract, termed a "peace pact" between the
company and the Chauffeurs' Union went into effect on January 29, 1926,
almost four years after the initial strike was launched." But the "peace"
involved union compromise.
The new contract created a new business model for the taxicab
companies, one that was a hybrid between commissions and a stipulated
wage. Under this contract, all 400 drivers of the Yellow Cab Co. received a
guaranteed wage of $4 per day and commissions over a stated weekly sum
each week. For businesses, this hybrid-model was advantageous because it
lowered their financial liabilities and increased overall potential revenue.
Drivers, under this hybrid system, had an incentive to work harder and longer
than under the previous set-pay for set-hours arrangement. The business
model also applied to union drivers at the other companies where drivers
were previously making $4.50 per day without commissions. The important
tradeoff for the Union was that San Francisco taxi drivers were 100%
unionized.60 Yellow Cab, relieved to have lowered the set daily wage and
partially returned to commissions, proudly declared that the agreement made
the company the "largest unionized taxicab company in the country."6
56.

Id.

57.

100 Join S.F. Taxi Driver Union, Aug. 29, 1925 (on file with author).

58.

By that time, union drivers received $4.50 a day plus tips, while the non-union drivers received

20-30% of their earnings plus tips. See id.
59.

Taxicab War Ends on 4 Year Pact, Jan. 29, 1926 (on file with author).

60.

Id.

61. Id. In November 1925, Yellow Cab had acquired Checker Cab Company and Black and White
Cab Company. These cab companies merged their operations in both San Francisco and Los Angeles,
creating a single company with a gross revenue of almost $3.8 million and over 2,500 employees. The
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TABLE 2: EARLY 20TH CENTURY CHAUFFEURS' UNION ACHIEVEMENTS

Year

Union Demand

Union Action

Outcome

1910

Free Gasoline
Limited Workday
Set Commission
Rate

3 Week Strike

Free Gasoline
12-hour Workday
20% Commission
Rate

19141918

Set Wage
Limited Workday

Politicized Lobbying of
Municipality

$4 Per Day Wage
10-hour Workday

19221925

Higher Wages

3 Year Strike (resulting in
a dramatic increase in the
use of "scab" or nonunion workers.)

$4.50 Per Day
Wage + Tips for
Union Drivers
20-30%
Commission Rate
for Non-Union
Drivers

C. Stability Amidst Economic Chaos: The Great Depression,

Regulation, and Return of the PoliticizedBargain
In December 1929, at the very outset of the Great Depression, the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors leveraged its power over the taxicab industry
to pass a historic ordinance regulating the industry. The 1929 Ordinance
required the employers to provide insurance and protected union labor in the
case of a corporate merger.6 2 The ordinance also limited competition by
regulating the number of taxicabs licensed to operate in the city. This was
achieved through the introduction of medallions over the next few years.
Medallions were municipal permits required before taxicab owners could put
taxicabs onto the street (distinct from a license needed to drive a taxi). The
medallion system allowed municipal regulators to keep track of the number
of taxis on the street and to ostensibly regulate their volume per need."

Yellow Cab Company of San Francisco at the time operated 225 cabs, Checker operated 145 cabs, Yellow
Cab of Los Angeles operated 300, and Black and White of Los Angeles operated 80. The new corporation
was headquartered in San Francisco with Arthur C. Smith and George A. Baldi as the heads. $4,000,000
Taxi Merger Completed, Nov. 28, 1925.
62.
63.

Taxi Barons EndorsedBy Supervisors, Dec. 1929 (on file with author).
In order to generate income and ensure that taxi owners were not "fly by night" business men,

cities often commodified the medallions, giving them artificial value and selling them on the open market.
In New York City, as elsewhere in the country, commodified medallions first emerged during the Great
Depression under the Haas Act of 1937, issued at a price of $5 each. San Francisco regulators likely
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The new law, which made market entrance more difficult for both firms
and drivers, was hailed by the Chauffeurs' Union because it limited
competition for individual drivers whose wages above $4 were from
commission.6 4 The new law made it impossible for new companies to enter
the field and for existing companies to expand unless they could prove market
demand. In the years prior to the implementation of the ordinance, taxi
drivers who did not work for a company but drove their own taxis had
become an increasingly common phenomenon." The ordinance limited the
number of people-workers, capitalists, and worker-capitalists-who could
enter the profession. The ordinance also mandated that employers provide
liability insurance to drivers to protect cab patrons and pedestrians." Finally,
and perhaps most remarkably, the Chauffers' Union succeeded in adding an
amendment to protect union labor in the event of a merger. 7
Amid the increased competition that propelled the 1929 ordinance,
Yellow Cab began a rate war with other taxicab companies, drastically
reducing their fares to increase loyalty and patronage. But this fare reduction
made drivers fear for their future wages. The Chauffeurs' Union, meanwhile,
demanded both a higher wage of $5 per day and reduced working hours from
ten to nine hours per day, including lunch.6' Through arbitration, the Union
agreed to a new pay scale: $4 per day, which was $.25 less than the prevailing
wage. But a new basis for commissions was included in the new agreement,
which the Union expected would bring about a substantial increase in
earnings. Drivers received 25% of all fares more than $58 per week on a day
shift, and $60 per week on a night shift. 9
The dropping rates led the Chauffeurs' Union to request that the Board
of Supervisors help guarantee an acceptable wage for workers. Savvy to the
fact that a "race to the bottom" on rates was not good for taxi workers who
would only see their salaries lowered and the income from their commissions
decrease, the Chauffeurs' Union pushed the Board of Supervisors to establish
a "minimum rate," just as they had established a maximum rate back in
1913.0 The request for a minimum rate was met with controversy, with
taxicab companies arguing that it would "stifle competition."

attributed financial value to the medallion at or before this time. See generally Biju Mathew, TAXI!: CABS
AND CAPITALISM IN NEWYORK CITY (2005).
Id.; see also Taxi Men Ask Raise, Jan. 1930 (providing number of drivers) (on file with author).
64.
Taxi Drivers Urge Law to Settle Rates, July 2, 1931. Newspaper accounts reveal that although
65.
these men were not represented by the union, union officials did hold sway over them.
66.

Id.
Id. Specifically, the amendment provided that in the case of a lockout resulting from a corporate
67.
taxi merger, the supervisors would permit union forces to operate cabs. Id.
Taxi Rate War Looms; Yellow Slashes Price, THE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 4, 1930.
68.
69.
70.

Taxi Drivers Get New Wage Scale, May 2, 1931.
Taxi Drivers Urge Law to Settle Rates, July 2, 1931 (on file with author).
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The demand for a minimum rate resulted in a raging debate over the role
of the city in regulating the taxi industry. Good jobs were on the line, but
taxicab companies argued that market prices should not be touched. By June
1931, the Board of Supervisors voted unanimously for such a minimum rate
ordinance, but the former city attorney and counsel for two taxicab
companies, John Dailey, halted the effort." In this context, S.T. Dixon argued
that the only way to keep the industry afloat was to pass an ordinance with a
maximum and minimum fare rate. He maintained that total deregulation of
the industry, as advocated by Dailey, would be "disastrous":
The taxicab industry is suffering from cut-throat competition, as a result of
which it is in such financial straits as to be unable to pay the $5 wages to the
drivers, which has been recognized as a minimum living wage.. .The
demoralized condition of the industry, due to. .. cutthroat competition, is a
menace not only to the capital invested in the industry, but to the jobs and the
established working conditions of chauffeurs. . .The only alternative to the
proposed maximum and minimum rate ordinance is a policy of nonregulation, which would have a disastrous effect both on the industry and the
public.72
The next month, on July 3, 1931, The Daily News published an editorial,
arguing that the taxi industry constituted a public utility but revealing an
anxiety about regulatory capitalism more generally. The Daily News wrote:
Here is a borderline business in a hazy zone between unregulated private
industry and privately owned utilities that are protected in a monopoly of their
field in return for submitting to rate fixing by the city or state. Like street
railway and lighting companies, the taxis use public streets and must be
regulated as to stands, maximum rates and safety standards. Should this
regulation be extended to protect them from cutthroat competition? Does the
city's fixing of a maximum above which they may not charge entitle them to
a similar fixing of a minimum? In the showing by owners and employees of
operating losses and low wages, The News sees a strong argument for an
affirmative answer.
On July 14, 1931, the Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance that
guaranteed a minimum rate and an acceptable wage for taxi workers. The
vote passed overwhelmingly, fifteen to one. 74
After this massive regulatory intervention in 1929 and 1931, the city saw
relatively secure labor conditions for taxi workers. One strike against Luxor
cab arose in March 1932, but otherwise, news archives do not reveal major
Union clashes with companies or the Board of Supervisors during much of
the early 1930s. While taxi workers in San Francisco certainly suffered
during the Great Depression-as all working people did- their conditions

72.

Set Hearingon Taxi Protests,June 30, 1931 (on file with author).
Id.

73.

Taxi Fares Again, THE DAILY NEWS, July 3, 1931.

74.

BoardAdapts New Taxicab Ordinance, S.F. BULL., July 14, 1931.

71.
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were tolerable.7 ' This was a strikingly different reality than elsewhere in the
country, where, amidst the throes of the Great Depression, "the number of
taxicabs skyrocketed, while occupancy rates and revenue per taxi declined,"
resulting in unbearable working conditions and untenable wages for
workers.
As taxi workers across the country suffered during this period, San
Francisco drivers enjoyed relatively stable lives, protected by strong union
leadership and municipal intervention. The militancy of the Chauffeurs'
Union under S.T. Dixon and the Board of Supervisors' willingness to heed
concerns about worker security allowed taxi workers to earn a stable wage
and drive limited hours. A 1935 American Federation of Labor (AFL) article
called the San Francisco Chauffeurs' Union the "strongest organization of its
kind in the United States."n The Union's efforts reflected a vision of
securing a bargain for the greater social good by working to influence overall
economic policy, not just wages.
II.
IT'S A (NEW) DEAL: THE TAXI UNION'S MODERATE BARGAIN AND
RECEDING REGULATION, 1935-1979

Four decades after the passage of the New Deal and the legalization of
collective bargaining by the Wagner Act, the strong political bargain
established by the Chauffeurs' Union unraveled. During this time, San
Francisco taxi workers went from 100% unionization to being legally
unqualified for unionization. In Part II, I use newspaper archives, municipal
records, and interviews with former taxi workers to help explain the decline
of the early 20' century radical bargain for taxi workers in San Francisco. I
argue that legal and legislative decisions to allow deregulation together with
political fracture within the Union led to its demise.
The character of the Union and its leadership by the 1950s had changed
from radical to moderate. While the New Deal had legitimized the labor
movement and encouraged unionization, the laws and regulations passed in
the post-war period-including the Labor Management Relations Act of
Alongside
1947-served to subdue the Chauffeurs' Unions' tactics.

75.

Interview with Charles Rathbone, San Francisco Taxi Worker and Taxi Historian, in San

Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 29, 2012).
Dempsey, supra note 23 at 73 (citing Mark Frankena & Paul Pautler, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
76.
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB REGULATION (1984)).
Arthur Elsten, Chauffeurs' Union Seeks Wage Change, Sept. 12, 1935.
77.

78. Many of the Taft-Hartley amendments focused on undermining the possibility of workstoppages, including amendments to the NLRA that demanded a "cooling off period"-an 80-day notice
before a strike could begin-and that outlawed the use of secondary boycotts but allowed employers to
take active anti-union stances to deter their workers from mobilizing. See Steven E Abraham, How the
Taft-Hartley act hinderedunions, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 12-16 (1994).
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changes in the federal legal regime that undermined strike possibilities,
municipal regulators also worked actively to prevent direct actions. In this
political and legal environment, the Chauffeurs' Union strategically
employed a message of "harmony" with Yellow Cab and distanced itself
from the militant organizing ethos that had characterized its early years.79
During this time, too, the Union's central focus shifted away from
organizing a mass base of workers and establishing a contract with taxi
companies. Those accomplishments were complete. Instead, the Union's
attentions centered on enforcing the contract and defending the proprietary
interests of Yellow Cab from the threats posed by non-union drivers and
smaller companies." While Yellow Cab's interests in many cases coincided
with the interests of the large majority of their membership, the Union's
defense of Yellow Cab's contracts with the city tarnished its reputation. To
both news reporters and some workers, the centrality of this advocacy
fostered the impression that the Union was Yellow Cab's ally rather than
adversary.
Over the next two decades, the Chauffeurs' Union realized a moderate
bargain, its leadership emphasizing "cooperation between labor and
management" and municipal regulators providing brokerage whenever
necessary. In the postwar years, even when strike possibilities arose, they
were most often averted through compromise, frequently facilitated by the
intervention of municipal leadership. As a result, the Union spent less energy
politicizing and mobilizing its membership-undertakings which had been
central to effecting work stoppages in the prior decades. In this atmosphere,
the Union lost any leverage it once had over the business model of the large
taxi companies.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Union's more conservative stance
on a variety of social issues-including race and racism-led to fracture with
its more politically radical rank-and-file members. Accordingly, in the late
1970s when San Francisco taxicab companies adopted a lease-based business
structure, the Union had limited power to discourage its workers from
embracing it. The city's regulatory decision to allow the practice of leasing
coupled with legal decisions by the appellate courts and the NLRB ultimately

79.

Perhaps influenced by the national discussion resulting in the Taft-Hartley Act, a heated internal

Union debate in the late 1940s called for an end to the use of radical or "goon" tactics, including
intimidation and assault. Charles Rathbone, Taxis and SF Labor History, UNITED TO WIN! (United

Taxicab Workers, S.F., Cal.), Fall 2001, at 4.
80.
Melyvn Dubofsky argues that for unions nationally during the 1950s and 1960s, "the salient
issues concerned contract implementation." Melvyn Dubofsky, THE STATE & LABOR IN MODERN
AMERICA 213 (1994). He points out that both industrial relations experts and labor lawyers of the time
recommended that "both unions and managements negotiate agreements that provided for binding
arbitration as a substitute for the right to strike during the duration of a contract." Id. This, he argues,
guaranteed economic stability, "protect[ed] the rights of individual workers through institutionalized,
nondisruptive collective action, and reduce[d] direct state regulation." Id.
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sanctioned the companies' leasing model, which had been designed to shift
corporate risk onto workers and to undermine collective bargaining. When
given the choice, many taxi workers, distrustful of their union, embraced the
lease and turned their backs on seven decades of organized representation by
the Chauffeurs' Union.
A.

The Rise of Harmony in the 1950s: The Chauffeurs' Union and
Yellow Cab Unite Against IndependentDrivers

The years immediately following World War II were marked by discord
in the taxicab industry. But the conflict was not centrally between taxicab
companies and taxi drivers. Rather, the more significant fight was between
smaller businesses (and the workers who drove for them) and Yellow Cab
(and the Chauffeurs' Union). By this time, a number of taxi medallions
belonged to smaller taxi companies or individual drivers (the
"independents") who felt that municipal regulation unfairly favored the
larger companies, such as Yellow Cab. Rank-and-file Yellow Cab drivers
comprised most of the Chauffeurs' Union's membership, making an unlikely
marriage between Yellow Cab and the Union.
In this oligopolistic market, the Union became divisive and
exclusionary. Rather than representing the interests of all taxi workers, its
efforts were wound up in the proprietary interests of Yellow Cab. This was
especially true when it came to regulatory decisions affecting access to
ridership. Crucially, labor leadership exacerbated the appearance of a
concordant relationship with Yellow Cab by publicly emphasizing harmony
and the need to address "transportation needs" rather than workers' problems
and needs."
Indeed, rather than uniting behind the cause of workers who drove for
the smaller companies, the Chauffeurs' Union was an outspoken critic of
these workers.82 By 1955, the Independent Taxicab Operators' Association

81. See, e.g., DECLARATIONS OF CANDIDACY, CITY OF S.F., at 17 (Nov. 6, 1945),
http://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November6-1945.pdf (providing Ernest Lotti's candidacy
statement for Board of Supervisors).
82. By the early 1950s, the number of independent operators had grown to 250, and together, they
formed an interest group called the "Independent Taxicab Operators' Association." Hearings Set on
Taxicabs S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 18, 1955; see also Driver Invites Jailin Cab Fight, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec.
3, 1957. The "independents" or the "anti-Yellows," as they were frequently called, waged regulatory
battles to gain access to business held by larger companies. See, e.g., Cab Drivers' 'Beef' Halted, S.F.
EXAMINER, May 20, 1953. These battles included fighting for the right to pick up passengers from taxi
stands around town, including at the Ferry Building, where military, tourist, and industrial ships frequently
unloaded. Id. The independents both lobbied and publicly demonstrated to achieve their ends.
Unsupported by the Chauffeurs' Union, the independents represented their own economic interests in
demonstrations and protested despite threats of criminal charges. One such demonstration took place in
May 1953 outside the Ferry Building, where Yellow and DeSoto cab drivers picked up passengers from
the Southern Pacific ferry docking. The Chauffeurs' Union's Business Agent at the time, Ernest Lotti,
reported that he spoke with the fifteen or so independent drivers who were protesting. Although the
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started a formal campaign against Yellow Cab's parking privileges." During
the course of this campaign, which was characterized by civil disobedience,
protests, and demonstrations (including "honk-outs" in which taxis circled
City Hall while honking their horns), taxi drivers' interests diverged.84
Drivers working for smaller companies and for themselves favored access to
Yellow Cab's parking privileges. But because their Yellow Cab drivermembers benefitted from those privileges, the Chauffeurs' Union worked
alongside Yellow Cab to oppose their demands."
The rift that the Chauffeurs' Union cemented between Yellow Cab
workers and workers at smaller companies foreshadowed the undoing of
labor unity in the coming years.
B. Decline ofDirect Action and Work Stoppages Against Big Taxi by
the 1960s
By the 1960s, the Chauffeurs' Union's lack of direct actions and
diminishing political engagement stood in sharp contrast to radical civil
rights groups mobilizing in San Francisco. While the Union expended a great
deal of energy defending Yellow Cab's proprietary pick-up spots around the
city, the Union's tactics regarding actual wages and working conditions at
Yellow Cab were decidedly less combative, despite, in at least one crucial
instance, the desires of union workers.
In 1964, Yellow Cab drivers voted in favor of a strike but did not receive
the necessary strike sanction from the Teamsters' executive board." The
drivers voted "reluctantly" to accept a one-year contract that was opposed by
most members. The vote was divided: 297 for the contract and 347 opposed. 7
Union officers who proposed acceptance of the contract were booed during
a work stoppage meeting.88
In this instance, the Union emphasized cooperation over direct action.
The Union's negotiating committee had originally asked Yellow Cab for a
$2 daily increase in guaranteed wages (which would have raised the taxi

Chauffeurs' Union did not represent these workers, Lotti was able to convince them to end their protest.
He told the newspaper, "I just told them to forget it, and go to work. They did." Id.
83.
HearingsSet on Taxicabs S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 18, 1955; see also Driver Invites Jail in Cab
Fight, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 3, 1957.
84.

Independent Cabs Declare Parking War. S.F. NEWS, Nov. 5, 1957.

85.

Drivers Oppose 'Open' Cab Stands. S.F. EXAMINER. Feb. 20, 1963. The president of the

Chauffeurs' Union at that time, Anthony Cancilla, stood up for Yellow Cab, speaking out against the
independent drivers. He testified before the police committee of the Board of Supervisors stating that the

city's independent cab drivers "hate Yellow Cab" and that if the city allowed the independent drivers to
park in the cab stands, it would, "add further bewilderment, further confusion, further chaos to the taxicab

industry. " Id.
86.
87.

Reluctant Cab Drivers Settle, S.F. EXAMINER, June 8, 1964.
Id.

88.

Id.
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workers' daily pay to $15), seven paid holidays each year (as opposed to
none), a 5% per hour increase in the pension fund, and increased vacation
and sick leave benefits." The only concessions it received from the company
were minor-vacation pay and pension improvements.90 Nevertheless, the
Union's negotiating committee recommended acceptance, according to a
committee member "because rejection would have created 'a long and costly
9
strike that would have created undue hardship upon [the workers]."' ' And
92
The Union's
yet, the drivers had voted to strike less than a week prior.
ethos of
militant
the
to
language and rhetoric of harmony, in sharp contrast
93
Dixon's era, rang a discordant note in the ears of most taxi workers.
Even when the Union was willing to strike during this era, both legal
maneuvers by the taxicab companies and forced mediation by municipal
regulators forestalled the possibility, perhaps sending the message to union
members that their leaders were not completely behind them. In late July
1970, the Union declined to bargain regarding the proposed installation of
speed recording devices in its cabs and threatened to strike if the company
installed the devices in any of its cabs.94 Yellow Cab sought to forestall a
strike by seeking an injunction in Superior Court. A year later, in June 1971,
a strike was again averted when San Francisco Mayor Alioto successfully
negotiated a contract between the Union and Yellow Cab." By this time,
Yellow Cab had roughly 500 of the city's 800 medallions, and the 1,200
Yellow Cab drivers who were represented by the Union sought
improvements in pension plans, health and welfare benefits, and a higher
weekly guarantee of their $75 per week income." The Union received strike
sanction from both the San Francisco Labor Council and the International
Union.97 But because of the impact the strike would have on the city, Mayor
Alioto mediated until the Union and Yellow Cab reached an agreement."

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

9I.

Id.

92.

Id.

93. Nevertheless, the union did support a strike of cab drivers at the much smaller and less
influential taxi company, Veterans' Cab. Veterans' Cab drivers walked out in protest of their contract
violations in 1967. The Union alleged that the company refused to pay overtime for the sixth day of work

and was requiring drivers to pay for their own gasoline. Drivers'Strike Ties Up Veterans S.F. Cab Fleet,
S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 28, 1967.
94.

Yellow Cab Seeks Strike Injunction, S.F. EXAMINER, July 30, 1970.

95.

George Rhodes, Taxi Strike Off-Alioto in Key Role, S.F. EXAMINER, June 25, 1971.

96.

CabbiesSet to Strike on Friday, S.F. EXAMINER, June 22, 1971.

97.

Id.

98.

Rhodes, supra note 95.
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Turning its Back on Worker Dignity: Racial Minoritiesand the
Chauffeurs' Union in the 1960s- 70s

"

'

Alongside the decline in work stoppages, the Union's fight for worker
dignity seemed to take a back seat to harmony with Yellow Cab. In
interviews, drivers who entered the industry in the 1960s noted a general
perception among cab drivers that the Union was "corrupt" and "in cahoots
with the company."9 9 This perception, true or not, is revealing, and
corroborates newspaper accounts that documented the disconnect between
the Union and workers, particularly racial minorities and "hippies."
In 1971, for example, the Union decided to publically back Yellow Cab
in the company's decision to discipline drivers who did not meet its dress
code. Specifically, Yellow Cab had suspended twenty-seven drivers for
"failing to meet a company requirement that beards be neatly trimmed and
that hair not fall below collar length."o In the political moment, long hair
and a beard were not signs of dishevelment, but political statements,
representing personal liberty and leftist activism. Six of the men suspended
had filed grievances with the Union, but the Union President publicly stated
that Yellow Cab "being a private firm, has the right under the contract to
demand a neat and clean appearance."' 0
The suspended drivers, enraged at the Union, claimed that "the local
[had] teamed up with the company 'to get rid of the younger hairy drivers
who have been demanding better working conditions."' 0 2 About one hundred
long-haired drivers formed a "Dissident Drivers" committee and converged
upon the Union claiming that it was conspiring with Yellow Cab.'03 The
"dissidents" hired their own attorney and told the press, "The local and
Yellow Cab are out to eliminate us ... because the young drivers have
formed a coalition with the black drivers to get better working conditions."'04
The dissident workers sued Yellow Cab on the long hair issue, but five years
later, the district court decided against them, stating that as their employer,
Yellow Cab had the right to dictate the terms of their appearance.

99. See Interview with Robin Goodings, Taxi Worker and UTW Advocate, San Francisco, Cal.
(Aug. 7, 2013); Interview with Samuel Tesfaye, Taxi Worker, Oakland, Cal. (May 23, 2012).
100.

Taxi-Hair Issue Put in Kagel Hands, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 17, 1970.

101.

Id.

102.

Id.

103.

Long-Hairs Assail Cabbies' Union, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 13, 1970.

104.

Id.

105.

See Rulings on Long Hairfor Cab, Bus Drivers, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 1975 ("U.S. District

Judge Stanley A. Weigel said that the Yellow Cab 'had the right to refuse to hire drivers solely because
their hair extended below their collar lines ...
He
I.' cited an opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which said, in part: 'A private employer may require male employees to adhere to different

modes of dress and grooming than those required of female employees and such does not constitute an
unfair employment practice."' (citing Baker v. Cal. Land Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974)).
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Arab American driver, Robert Abraham, alleged that the Union did not
properly support him when he was fired from Luxor for blowing the whistle
on Luxor's racist hiring policies, which, he alleged, excluded black drivers."'
Dissent within the union grew. The media took note. Dick Nolan, a
columnist for the San Francisco Examiner who regularly wrote on the
taxicab industry, wrote, "And backing Big Yellow [as in Yellow Cab], as it
has for years, is Big Labor. Their interests coincide, and have nothing to do
with the public weal."" 2
D. PartialDeregulationand the Ascendancy ofLeasing

Amidst the Union's decreasing authority with its workers came partial
deregulation of the taxi industry and corporate restructuring. Transportation
legal scholar Paul Dempsey argues that "[by the late-seventies],
[d]eregulation emerged in a comprehensive ideological movement which
abhorred government pricing and entry controls. . ."' " While this ideological
force resulted in the total deregulation of the taxi industry in many cities
across the country (along with deregulation of several other infrastructure
industries), San Francisco saw limited deregulation. Nevertheless, the
combination of more laissez faire municipal regulation, a weakened union,
and clever business restructuring resulted in de-unionization of the industry
by 1978."

While entry into the industry remained regulated, the city deregulated
the relationship between the taxi companies and their workers by allowing
taxi companies to "lease" taxis to workers instead of requiring companies to
pay them per shift. This practice of leasing eventually led to the dissolution
of the employer-employee relationship and to the rise of the independent
contractor taxi worker. However, because many drivers were initially given
a choice between employee and independent contractor status, this shift could
have been slowed or halted had taxi workers felt a stronger allegiance to the
Chauffeurs' Union."' But by this time, the Union's values did not reflect the
more radical values of its rank-and-file workers.

regulation-obeying co-workers to stay off the job or . .. to return their taxis to the lot. . ." The Union
president, Peter Derenale, back-tracked on his earlier position and charged the company with
"discrimination, favoritism, and harassment." Id. The settlement that was reached after the strike
"ban[ned] floral or brightly patterned shirts, khaki, denim, or corduroy pants, or those with vivid stripes
and leather jackets." Id.
111. See Ken Wong, Cabbie Claims Union Work Took HisJob, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 3, 1973.
112. Dick Nolan, CallingCab Shots, S.F. ExAMINER, Sept. 17, 1968.
113. Dempsey, supra note 23, at 75.
I14. See Dubal, supranote 6.
115. Interview with Joseph Tracy, San Francisco Taxi Worker, San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 17, 2013).
Joe Tracy was the lead plaintiff in Tracy v. Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc., No. 938786 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 22, 1996), which sought employee status for San Francisco taxi workers for unemployment insurance
and workers' compensation purposes.
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Prior to the 1970s, "leasing" taxicabs to drivers had been viewed with
suspicion and even outlawed by San Francisco city regulators. After the
passage of the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947 and its exclusion of
independent contractors from the National Labor Relations Act, taxicab
116
companies nationwide began to experiment with leasing.
But this practice was not immediately tolerated in San Francisco. In
1950, allegations of medallion holders illegally leasing their medallions
reached the Police Commission of the Board of Supervisors, which, by that
time, had become the body responsible for regulating the taxicab industry."'
The Police Commission brought the holders of the taxi medallions together
during a hearing and asked who had violated the conditions of their
permits."' A Chauffeurs' Union representative attended the meeting and
accused taxicab companies and independent operators of forming "illegal ...
contracts" in which "a flat daily amount [is demanded] by an operator who
9
rents his cab out and lets the driver pocket everything above that amount."H
The president of the Police Commission explained that both leasing and
selling medallions without prior commission approval were illegal
activities.120 The Chauffeurs' Union eventually fined three of its members
for leasing their permits and working, in effect, as employers, rather than
driving the cabs themselves.1 2
By the late-1970s, this once illegal practice of taxi leasing had become
a ubiquitous phenomenon in the industry. The change to leasing allowed
companies to shift risk onto workers during a time of economic
uncertainty.' 2 2 This was not a simple or easy transition. For most of the
1970s, leasing taxicab drivers in San Francisco continued to be represented
by the Chauffeurs' Union and even received employee benefits. For
example, in 1972, drivers who operated under the leasing system received
$54.50 a month per driver for a health and welfare plan, $2.80 per day toward

116.

See Dubal, supra note 6; see also, e.g., Party Cab Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 87, 91 (7th

Cit. 1949) (discussing early taxicab leasing scheme in Illinois).
117.

See Cab FirmsDeny Violations ofPermitRules: Holders at Police Commission HearingReject

Charge, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 25, 1950.
118.

Id.

119.

Id.

120.

Id.

121.

Rathbone, supranote 75.

122.

This was emblematic of what academics call the "neoliberal" turn. In describing the business

origins of structural neoliberal practices, Boltanski and Chiapello explain, "[I]nterpretation of the crisis of
capitalism as a crisis of Taylorism had, since the beginning of the 1970s, prompted a number of initiatives
by employers to change the organization of work. LUc BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIIuT
OF CAPITALISM 218 (Gregory Elliot trans., Verso ed., 2005). "As early as 1980, Gerard Lyon-Caen
demonstrated that the proliferation of casual workers was the result of new strategies on the part of firms.

These strategies were structured around two points: a new employment policy, making it possible for the
employer to 'maintain a free hand,' and a new 'policy of enterprise structures,' such that employers - by
outsourcing manpower, for example - could 'shield themselves as employer."' Id. at 225-26.
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a pension plan, and $100 a week of vacation pay for up to four weeks.' 23
Though they did not earn a guaranteed wage by contract, they still benefited
enormously from union representation. But by 1979, leasing cab drivers were
understood as ineligible to participate in protected collective bargaining
because the federal courts were likely to consider them "independent
contractors" under the NLRA.' 24
How did leasing emerge so ubiquitously in San Francisco? In the late
1960s, San Francisco taxicab companies found themselves in tough financial
straits due to the decrease in tourism and the decline of military traffic
through the Bay Area. 125 Most companies had difficulty filling their shifts.
DeSoto, Veterans, and Luxor, the three largest taxicab companies after
Yellow Cab, began leasing taxis to willing drivers for $20-$22 a shift.1 26
Drivers were approached and asked if they would prefer to "lease" the cab
for a fixed amount instead of receive a guaranteed commission. Although
the Union discouraged drivers from accepting a "leasing" contract, many
drivers embraced leasing when given the choice due to general distrust of the
Union and the promise of extra income.1 27
Instead of earning revenue from the riding public, these companies
began earning money from the drivers themselves. Company profits, then,
were guaranteed, while the workers' assumed much of the risk because wages
were entirely dependent on the ridership on any given day. Why the
municipal regulators allowed leasing during this era when they had prevented
it just fifteen years prior is unclear from the record, but the dire financial
straits of the cab companies combined with the rising ubiquity of the
phenomenon nationally likely facilitated their acquiescence. 128

123.

Ups and Downs ofthe Taxi Business, Jan. 31, 1972 (on file with author).

124. See, e.g., Local 777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that leasing cab
drivers are not "employees" for the purposes of the NLRB).
125. See Yellow Cab Seeks Some BusinessAid, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 31, 1971.
126. These companies were loosely described as "cooperatives" in which individual medallion
holders came together under the auspices of the company. DeSoto, Veterans, and Luxor had 77, 65, and

58 medallions, respectively. See Delay in S.F. Taxi Strike. S.F. EXAMINER. Mar. 26, 1973.Yellow Cab
held over 500 medallions, and the remaining 96 medallions were held by individuals who had anywhere
from one to fifteen medallions. Russ Cone. Endofthe Roadfor Yellow Cab. S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 7, 1976.
127.
Interview with Joseph Tracy, supra note 115; Interview with Abebe Magiso, Taxi Worker,

Livermore, Cal. (Jan. 31, 2013). Both Mr. Tracy and Mr. Magiso worked under the Chauffeurs' Union in
the 1970s. Mr. Magiso's name has been changed to protect his identity.
128. Although earnings became unstable and less predictable, leasing drivers initially remained
"employees" and members of the Chauffeurs' Union, and even went on strike as leasing drivers for the
smaller companies. By 1973, the three "leasing" companies-Luxor, Veterans, and DeSoto-threatened

to raise their lease fees by $2 to $22 and $24 per shift (day and night), because the city-set taxi fare had
increased by five cents, allegedly allowing lease drivers to make more money. Delay in S.F. Taxi Strike,
S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 26, 1973. The Chauffeurs' Union voted to strike in response, stating that because
the city put more permits on the street in 1969, the drivers' income would not necessarily be augmented
by the rising fare. Id. One month after the strike vote, but before the drivers actually went on strike, drivers
re-voted and accepted a two-stage $2 cost of cab rental increase, with a $1 immediate increase and another

1$ increase after five months. 3 Cab Firm Drivers OK Rental Hike, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 25, 1973. In
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The idea (real or imagined) that the leasing driver could make more
money than the driver who worked for wages or on commission resulted in
the growing popularity of leasing among drivers. A newspaper account at
the time heralded the practice as "inspir[ing the driver] to work as hard as he
can." 2 9 Even Peter Derenale, the Chauffeurs' Union president stated,
"We've tried to keep them [the leasing drivers] down to [working] eight
hours a day but the guys don't want it.' One former driver quoted in the
newspaper said, "I work for Yellow and I'm guaranteed $16 no matter how
little I bring in on my waybill. If I don't put it all on the waybill, I can keep
it - if I don't get caught. On the other hand, if I pay $20 a day for my cab,
I'm not going to cheat myself, am I?"'`
E. Losing the Right to Unionize: The Bankruptcy of Yellow Cab,
Leasing, and Independent ContractorStatus in the 1970s
By the early 1970s, Yellow Cab, the largest carrier that had not yet
converted to the leasing model and that employed the greatest number of taxi
workers, requested public assistance from the city of San Francisco.132
Yellow Cab called itself a "quasi-public utility" and argued that if it received
no subsidy from the municipality, it would go out of business.1 33 Charles
O'Conner, the company's senior vice-president stated that a fare increase and
contract modifications with the Union would prevent the company from
folding. 134
Both the City and the Chauffeurs' Union took immediate action to help
Yellow Cab. In an unusual move, the Union took responsibility for the
company's financial losses. The Union went so far as to propose that
"volunteer" drivers work for ten hours, instead of the eight-hour limit, to
make more money for the company and to reduce the company's fringe
benefit costs.135 City regulators, too, committed to assisting Yellow Cab, in
large part because mobility in the city depended on the large cab company.
Despite receiving an eventual fare increase in the summer of 1971, Yellow
Cab attested to a financial loss of more than a half million dollars.' In early
1972, Yellow Cab's financial struggles persisted, and the company asked the

1976, lease taxicab drivers from DeSoto, Veterans, and Luxor went on a several-day strike, protesting a
proposal to raise lease fees by $3 per shift (which would have put the lease at $28.50 per day). Mediator
Steps into S.F. Taxi Dispute, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 5, 1976.
129. Charles Raudebaugh, Ups and Downs of the Taxi Business, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 31, 1972.
130.

Id.

131.

Id.

132.

See Yellow Cab Seeks Some Business Aid, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 31, 1971.

133.

Id.

134.

Id.

135.

See Jackson Rannells, Yellow Cab's2 Plans to Bail Out, S.F. EXAMINER, July 22, 1972.

136.

Id.
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Union to consider rolling back the terms of the three-year contract signed the
previous July.137
Although Yellow Cab's financial straits were continually blamed on
labor costs and Union demands, the situation was largely caused by corporate
corruption and malfeasance, information that only became public knowledge
years later. Westgate California, the parent company of Yellow Cab, had
siphoned off Yellow Cab's profits to satisfy the obligations of its larger
holdings. When Westgate went bankrupt due to embezzlement and
mismanagement, the Yellow Cab permits became assets during the
bankruptcy proceedings."'
Westgate's instability resulted in four years of Yellow Cab ownership
uncertainty. Before Westgate's corrupt practices were made public, the
company directed Yellow Cab to begin selling its permits for profit.3 9 The
Union opposed the individual sale of permits because that would upset its
power under the law to protect taxi workers as a group. If Yellow Cab, as a
large corporation holding many medallions, dissolved and disaggregated into
individual entities, then the Union would have had to reconstitute itself as a
bargaining unit or units in the face of multiple employers. As the Union's
secretary James Strachen said, "[I]f Yellow continues to sell its permits, 'our
members will gradually lose their jobs to individual owner-operators."" 4 0
In September 1972, Yellow Cab's continued sale of medallions to
individuals prompted a five-hour strike by Yellow Cab drivers.14 ' The
walkout, called by the Union, specifically targeted the method of selling the
medallions.' 42 Since few drivers could actually afford to purchase a
medallion outright, Yellow Cab offered a financing option that allowed them
to retain interest until the bank loan was fully paid.1 43 This, the Union
explained, was a violation of their contract which made it plain that Yellow
Cab had to divest itself of any interest in any permit it sold.' 44 The strike
ended after a mediation session with Mayor Alioto.1 45 Yellow Cab agreed to
137.

Yellow Cabbies Stop Work to Talk Strike, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 27, 1972.

138.
HEIDI MACHEN & JORDANNA THIGPEN, OVERVIEW OF THE SAN FRANCISCO TAXI INDUSTRY
AND PROPOSITION K (2007), http://www.medallionholders.com/docs/overview-of-prop-k.pdf (last visited

Dec. 16, 2016).
139.

See Union Leader Hits Yellow Cab Sale ofPermits, S.F. EXAMINER, July 27, 1972. Westgate

had purchased the company for $5.5 million, and if it could sell all the medallions, it could make up to
$11 million, at a profit of$6.5 million. Jim Strachen, Letter to the Editor, S.F. EXAMINER. Aug. 20, 1972.
At the time, the City sold medallions for $7,500, but Yellow Cab began selling them piecemeal for $22,000
each, with a down payment of$1,000 and the balance due at 7.5%. Id. Letters were sent to all the drivers,

offering the sale of medallions. The first medallion was sold to a veteran vehicle. Id.
140.

Teamsters Move to Buy Yellow Cab, S.F. CHRON, Aug. 25, 1972.

141.

See George Rhodes, Yellow Cabs Truce OKd, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 9, 1972.

142.

See id.

143.

See id.

144.

Id.

145.

Id.
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a sixty-day moratorium on selling medallions, and the Union agreed to
46
consider permitting drivers to work longer hours.'
In response to Yellow Cab's financial uncertainty, Mayor Alioto put
together a three-member committee to make recommendations on how the
city should respond. The committee recommended to Mayor Alioto that
Yellow Cab rescind all sales of its medallions which had not been completed,
that the city make a ten cent per mile increase in fare rates to relieve Yellow
Cab's financial difficulties, and that the company design a new work day
schedule "to afford drivers more work (and pay) opportunity and the
company greater income."'4 7 The Mayor's committee said sales of Yellow
Cab medallions were "retrogressive" because "the prices, plus the $1000
transfer fee, would place 'an unreasonable burden' on the buyers . . . [and]
poses serious problems for minorities . . . because the price would be
prohibitive."'48
In 1974, despite receiving a rate increase from the city, Yellow Cab
announced plans to terminate all medical, dental, and pension payments for
its drivers.14 Finally, after many decades of taking a conciliatory stance
toward the company, the Union sanctioned a strike against Yellow Cab.'
Yellow Cab filed a complaint with the NLRB alleging secondary boycott
charges when Yellow Cab drivers in San Jose and Oakland also began
striking."' After two weeks of strikes, the Board of Supervisors finally
agreed to increase the flag rate, which allowed Yellow Cab to increase their
pay to workers.' 5 2 The strike ended. 5
Despite the increase, by the end of 1976, Yellow Cab dissolved. On
April 5, 1976, Yellow Cab ceased operations, and its 500 taxicabs and 950
workers were off the road.1 54 The Union ordered drivers to apply for
unemployment insurance.' A court ordered seizure of Yellow Cab's assets

146.

See id.

147.

Close Scrutiny on Tari Fares, S.F. ExAMINER, Dec. 28, 1972.

148.

Id.

149.

James Strachan, Opinion, An Open Letter to All San Franciscans, S.F. EXAMINER, June 27,

1974.
150.
151.

Id.; Alioto Urges Cab Boost, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 2, 1974.
Yellow Cab Suit on Pickets Outside S.F., S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 1974.

Keith Power, S.F. Taxi FaresAre Going Up, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 1974.
Id. Amidst the strike, then Supervisor (and eventually U.S. Senator) Diane Feinstein voted
against a fare increase and urged establishing a "taxi panel." The panel, she said, would bring City Hall
'"long-term solutions, including a program for effective regulation of the rate structure.' She also
envisioned that the committee would delve into "taxi fare, issuance of taxi permits, taxi record keeping,
policing, use of curb parking, and a possible zone system of fare." Supervisor Feinstein said, "'It would
bring us a long-term master cab plan for The City."' Diane Urges Taxi Panel. Aug. 3, 1974 (on file with
author).
154. Yellow Cab Might Shut Down Statewide, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 5, 1976.
155. Raul Ramirez, Yellow Cab's up for Sale, Moscone Says, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 3, 1976 (on file
with author).
152.

153.
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The Superior Court of San Francisco received numerous offers on
Yellow Cab's assets.1 62 Patrick Shannon, a 26-year-old former Yellow Cab
driver who was in college studying political philosophy at the time, made an
63
Working with an
offer with almost 200 other former Yellow Cab drivers.'
cooperative
a
worker
attorney, the workers produced a creative plan to form
in which each driver would own his own medallion and drive his own car,
and the workers would jointly share other expenses, such as gas, oil, upkeep,
dispatching, and insurance.1 64
The Superior Court accepted the offer in May of 1977 only to "re-open
the bidding" less than one month later when attorney Harold Dobbs, a
prominent Republican politician and former President of the Board of
65
Harold Dobbs and his
Supervisors, said he would like to offer a bid too.'
investors won over the assets and subsequently sold 250 of the medallions
66
over to the "New Yellow Cab Cooperative"-the drivers themselves.1
About one hundred went to smaller companies, and the remaining 138 were
In the New Yellow Cab
"cancelled" by the Police Commission.'6 7
Cooperative, Jimmy Steele, former manager at DeSoto, became president of
6
the board of directors, and Patrick Shannon himself became vice-president. 1
Although the brainchild of workers, the new Yellow Cab evolved to use
a business model that was far from labor-friendly. When Yellow Cab reopened, the medallion holders owned the company cooperatively, but they
69
utilized non-unionized workers to do most of the driving.1 They also used
the leasing system exclusively, and by 1979, newspaper reports indicated that
the new Yellow Cab had forced its 600 non-member drivers to be
"independent contractors." 7 0
Both the city and the NLRB investigated the possibility that this was an
action taken explicitly to prevent unionizing, which would be a violation of
the NLRA, but to no avail.1 7 ' In 1979, the Yellow Cab day lease was $27,
and drivers were also paying about $13 per shift.1 72 The fact that drivers
could go home from working all day without a dollar in their pockets was not

162.

Dexter Waugh, 'A Scandal'-

Drivers Still Demandto Buy Yellow Cab, S.F. EXAMINER, June

13, 1977.
163. New Bid Duefor Yellow Cab Assets, Apr. 26, 1977 (on file with author).
164.

Id.

165.

Cabbies Bid Accepted for Yellow Here, May 13, 1977 (on file with author); Drivers Still

Demand to Buy Yellow Cab, S.F. EXAMINER, June 13, 1977.
Russ Cone, BoardBegins Again on Taxicab Reforms, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 15, 1977; No Joke,
166.
Yellow Cab PracticallyBack in Business, S.F. EXAMINER, May 16, 1977, at 8.
167.

Id.

168.

No Joke, Yellow Cab PracticallyBack in Business, S.F. EXAMINER, May 16, 1977, at 8.

169.

See supra note 10.

170.

Yellow Cab Faces Probe over Jobs, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 9, 1979.

171.

Id.

172.

Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc., Nos. 20-RC-1 4735 and 20-RC-14736 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 27, 1979).
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lost on the public. A San FranciscoExaminer columnist who had previously

extolled the possibilities of the "entrepreneurial" driver and the free market,
described the lease practice as "sharecropping.""
Some of the drivers for the medallion holders of the new Yellow Cab
cooperative took action. In 1979, 300 drivers participated in a picket and
boycott of Yellow Cab, demanding classification as employees.' 74 Jimmy
Steele, president of the new Yellow Cab cooperative and himself a driver,
responded that the boycotters were "a bunch of radicals ... They've got a
little minority group of people that are trying to disturb a lot of shit for no
reason." Rachel Burd, speaking on behalf of the boycotting drivers,
complained that this NLRB process could take three or four years and that
she and the other cab drivers could not wait for that long. 7 1 Another driver,
Bill Williams, a 39-year-old man with two young children, complained that
because of his shift to classification as an independent contractor his kids did
not have health insurance.'7 6

Just a month later, the NLRB concluded that because of the technicalities
of the leasing system, Yellow Cab did not exert enough control over its
drivers to call them employees. The drivers were legally independent
contractors under the NLRA. The Chauffeurs' Union lost its right to
collectively bargain on behalf of San Francisco taxi workers. 77

173.
174.

See Dick Nolan, Editorial, The Cabbie Is a Sharecropper,S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 25, 1979.
Lon Daniels, Waitingfor a Taxi: Yellow Cab Drivers out on the Picket Line, S.F. EXAMINER,

Mar. 9, 1979.
175.

Id.

176.

Id. With regard to unionization, Mr. Williams said, "It is the only course for the working man

if you want to have any kind of security, in the taxi industry particularly. You can't afford the benefits
individually... Your income varies [from day to day] so you have to have a group plan, which is the
union." Id
177. In particular, the NLRB decision stated that because of the way the lease worked, Yellow Cab
did not exert enough "control over the manner and means" of the drivers' work to "constitute the

employer." Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc., supra note 172. (finding that Yellow Cab Drivers were
independent contractors and not eligible for collective bargaining protections under the National Labor

Relations Act).
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employment status undermined the potential for widespread collective
mobilization.'" While some workers felt that employee identity was intrinsic
to labor power, others felt they could achieve and maintain economic security
without official NLRB recognition. The dialogue between workers and their
advocates on the employee-contractor issue depleted energy and caused
divisions about choice of strategy in emergent worker advocacy
organizations, the Alliance and the United Taxicab Workers.
Nevertheless, post-union activist chauffeur workers achieved a number
of victories for rank-and-file drivers-including maintaining the fight for a
stable wage and safety-net benefits.' These victories did not result from
bargaining directly with the taxi companies, but rather they arose through
near-constant engagement with municipal politics. The City and County of
San Francisco continued to have decision-making authority over taxi rates
and the number of taxi medallions issued-regulations left over from the
militant advocacy of the Chauffeurs' Union. Worker advocates leveraged
this hard-fought for regulatory framework from the early part of the twentieth
century to attain a measure of work stability. For over thirty years, from the
early 1980s to late 2013, full-time taxi workers had a relatively stable, though
low, income because driver-advocates constantly lobbied to curtail taxi
supply and control the price of their lease and the taxi fare.'
The potential for economic security for the de-unionized taxi workforce
certainly diminished toward the end of the twentieth century as San Francisco
became one of the most expensive cities in the world, but the concept of a
just wage for taxi workers endured in the regulatory arena.1 82 Activists forced
San Francisco lawmakers to consider the livelihoods of taxi workers each
time the city issued a new medallion, considered a fare hike, or adjusted the
price of the lease cap. 1 3 Worker advocates made sure that city supervisors
heard their perspectives during public deliberations and prior to making
decisions on industry regulation. While taxi companies continued efforts to
increase profits by shifting costs onto drivers, strong municipal regulation
made it possible for taxi worker advocates to push back. Though stymied by
the loss of their right to unionize and internal discord over their employment
status, worker activists successfully leveraged the city regulatory process.
These taxi drivers struck a bargain with the municipality and exchanged their
labor for a fragile economic security.

179.

See Dubal, supra note 6.

180.

See supranote 10.

Id.
182. While S.T. Dixon of the Chauffeurs' Union owned a home in San Francisco, most San
Francisco taxi drivers by the end of the twentieth century could not afford to live in the city where they
181.

worked. Chauffeurs Honor Return of PopularSecretary, Sept. 9, 1926 (on file with author); see supra

note 10. In my ethnographic research, I found that most lived in East Bay cities such as Richmond, El
Sobrante, and Oakland, and commuted to San Francisco for work. Id.
183.
Id.
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Give Us Back Our Bargain!: The Alliance and the United Taxicab
Workers

Four years after the NLRB decided that leasing taxi drivers were
84
taxi
independent contractors without the right to bargain collectively,
workers accustomed to the Chauffeurs' Union's leadership realized that they
had no one to advocate on their behalf.'. A number of workers banded
together to form ad hoc organizations aimed at using collective power to
86
better working conditions and push for a return to employee status.1
At the beginning of this uncertain time, on April 2, 1984, a group of six
The
taxicab drivers-four men and two women-founded the Alliance.'
Alliance operated on a purely voluntary basis, with no external funding."
The six worker-advocates dedicated themselves "to protecting the rights of
89
In
drivers to make an equitable wage under proper working conditions."'
the
playing
themselves
found
advocates
the
Alliance
campaign,
their first
role that the Chauffeurs' Union had played many times before them:
advocating to municipal regulators to limit the number of taxicabs on the
street to protect the wages of existing taxi workers.' 90 Although taxi workers
at the time were no longer working on commission or technically earning a
"wage,"' 9 ' the Alliance continued to use the language of the labor movement
("wages") to express both their sense of themselves as workers and their
desire to return to the employee status, which had just years before
guaranteed a bargained-for minimum wage.19 2
The Alliance founders included Ruach Graffis, Katherine Mann,
Jonathan Tufts, Lonnie Schuller, Dennis Gianatassio, and Garry
McGregor.1' They met regularly in the home of Ruach Graffis, and as a first
campaign, vowed to fight then-Mayor Diane Feinstein's proposal to put

184.

See supra note 124.

185. Interview with Ruach Graffis, San Francisco Taxi Worker and Alliance Co-founder, in San
Francisco, Cal. (July 8, 2013).
186.

Id.

187.

Katherine Mann, Where We Stand, Where We're Headed, THE ALLIANCE NEWSLETTER (San

Francisco Taxicab Drivers Alliance, San Francisco, Cal.) May 10, 1984. In the post-union era, women
are overrepresented amongst taxi workers who advocate for better working conditions. See supra note 10.
Even though the industry remains predominantly male, women figure boldly and importantly in the history

of San Francisco taxi advocacy from 1983. Id.
188.

Interview with Ruach Graffis, supra note 185.

189.

Id.

190.

See Press Release, S.F. Taxicab Drivers Alliance (July 15, 1984) (on file with author).

191.

Interview with Ruach Graffis, supranote 185.
Katherine Mann, supra note 187. The Alliance worker-advocates also showed a strong sense

192.

of solidarity with the labor movement more broadly by supporting local strikes and union-led worker
campaigns. See, e.g., Local 2, THE ALLIANCE NEWSLETTER (San Francisco Taxicab Drivers Alliance,
San Francisco, Cal.) Nov. 1984 (on file with author); Restaurant Strike Update, THE ALLIANCE

NEWSLETTER (San Francisco Taxicab Drivers Alliance, San Francisco, Cal.) Jan./Feb. 1985, at 5.
193.

Interview with Ruach Graffis, supranote 185.
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almost 300 more taxicabs on the streets of San Francisco.'94 They argued that

'

more taxicabs would depress the wages of existing taxi drivers by increasing
taxi supply.' 9 5 In addition to filing a lawsuit with the help of attorney Dan
Siegel,'9 6 which Alliance members funded out of their own pockets, 97 the
Alliance threatened to picket the Democratic National Convention, held in
San Francisco in 1984.198 Prior to the Convention, the Alliance successfully
staged a protest of several hundred drivers circling City Hall and picketed
outside the building.'
The triumphant outcome was that the city reduced
the number of new medallions issued from 300 to 41.200 The Alliance also
fought for a meter increase, brought attention to taxi drivers' health and safety
concerns, and shed light on police misconduct.2 0
During the Alliance's four-year tenure, leaders operated from the
assumption that a "return" to employee status was the key to bettering taxi
workers' conditions.2 02 As a 1986 editorial in the Alliance newsletter stated:
... [T]he "independent contractor" stands squarely in the way of this need
[for industry-wide organization]. One need only check the law regarding the
"rights" of independent contractors to organize. Establishingemployee rights
is the first step. Without such rights, [workers] stand alone. Independent.
Easy to push around.2 03

Alliance members saw gaining employee recognition under the law as the
most important initial step to re-establishing worker rights. Both the legal
ambiguity of their worker categorization and the seductive promise of
employee rights diverted attention from organizing to unify taxi workers.2 0 4
Without the growth of its membership, the Alliance became less active, and
the organization was defunct by 1988.205

194.

Id.

A Message to All of Our Customers. THE ALLIANCE NEWSLETTER (San Francisco Taxicab
Drivers Alliance, San Francisco, Cal.) May 30, 1984.
196. Id. Notably, Dan Siegel eventually founded the law offices of Siegel & Yee and continued to
195.

play an important role in San Francisco Bay Area social movements. See supra note 10. He even ran on

a progressive ticket for the Mayor of Oakland in 2014. Judy Silber, OaklandMayoralRace '14: Candidate
Dan Siegel, KALWORG (Oct. 21, 2014). http://kalw.org/post/oakland-mayoral-race-14-candidate-dansiegel#stream/0
197.

Interview with Ruach Graffis, supranote 185.

198.

Id.

199.

Id.

200.
Id. Alliance members claimed that even this relatively low number of new medallions resulted
in an almost 10% decrease in their wages. A Message to All of Our Customers, supra note 195.
201.
202.

Interview with Ruach Graffis, supra note 185.
THE ALLIANCE NEWSLETTER (San Francisco Taxicab Drivers Alliance, San Francisco, Cal.)

Dec. 28, 1984, 1-2.
203.

Letter to the Editor. THE ALLIANCE NEWSLETTER (San Francisco Taxicab Drivers Alliance,

San Francisco, Cal.) 1986.
204.
205.

See Dubal, supra note 6.
Interview with Ruach Graffis, supranote 185.
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Amidst the Alliance's decline, the United Taxicab Workers, San
Francisco's longest-running non-union taxi worker advocacy organization,
emerged. 2 06 The organization was initially committed to the radical
possibility of strength in numbers and defiantly called itself a "union" despite
its lack of status under the NLRA.2 07 Over the course of the 1990s, however,
the UTW gradually became more of a policy organization that advocated for
worker interests before regulators and courts. The UTW planned and
engaged in protests and organized many successful political campaigns,
leveraging municipal regulation and electoral politics to maintain a just wage
for taxi workers. 20 8 But, as with the Alliance, the UTW's legal and political
approach differed greatly from its early 2 0 th century counterpart. For
example, despite calls to strike, the UTW never effected a work stoppage that
lasted more than a few hours.209
During its first five years, the organization was mired in an internal
debate about whether to prioritize legal advocacy or organizing.210
Ultimately, the UTW achieved remarkable victories for workers through
policy advocacy alone without engaging in militant organizing or work
stoppages.211 Over the course of thirty years, volunteer taxi workers
harnessed their power in political spaces, lobbying city supervisors, mayors,
and taxi regulators to advocate for decent wages and working conditions.2 12
UTW's founders were a group of volunteer taxi workers, all white, U.S.born men and women, who envisioned organizing San Francisco's
increasingly diverse taxi workers to build collective worker power. 213 A
UTW newsletter underscored the importance of worker unity for the early
advocates, stating, "Unity means more power and power means more money
in our pockets, better living and working conditions, complete job-security
[sic] and respect all around . ."21 4 To achieve worker unity, UTW workeradvocates confronted two paths: organize drivers and/or work toward NLRB
recognition as a union. Although UTW attempted to travel down both paths
206. The UTW was officially founded on October 9, 1986. Interview with Mark Gruberg, San
Francisco Taxi Worker and UTW Advocate, in San Francisco, Cal. (July 21, 2012).
207. Interview with Ruach Graffis, supranote 185.
208. See supra note 10.
209. See supra note 10. The fall of the Alliance and the eventual shrinking of active UTW
membership reflected organizational decisions to put law and advocacy before organizing workers. These
were pragmatic decisions given the legal and historical moment. Because the California Employment
Development Division and the California Labor Commission repeatedly found individual taxi workers to
be employees for purposes of workers' compensation and unemployment insurance, drivers were
optimistic about the possibility of returning to the employee protections they previously enjoyed. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id
213. Interview with Mark Gruberg, San Francisco Taxi Worker and Advocate (July 1, 2012).
214. In Unity There is Strength, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab Workers, San Francisco, Cal.),
1986.
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primarily on the finding that the leasing system did not facilitate sufficient
employer control over the workers. 220 The NLRB appellate body, and
221
subsequently the Ninth Circuit, denied requests for review.
Nevertheless, the "return" to an employee rights narrative continued
with the assistance of the Communication Workers of America (CWA) who
joined forces with the UTW in the early 1990s. 222 Through both local
legislative advocacy and litigation, UTW and CWA attempted to achieve
collective bargaining status for the UTW.2 2 3 In late 1990 and early 1991,
UTW, under the leadership of paid CWA organizer and former taxi driver
Cliff O'Neill, made efforts to amend San Francisco laws to guarantee
employee rights for drivers. 2 24 They also circulated petitions to show drivers'
support for this initiative, but never received enough signatures to effect a
shift. 2 25 Soon thereafter, in late 1991, another membership drive was
orchestrated only to be defeated once again with the taxi company asserting
226
that nothing had changed since the NLRB's analysis three years prior.
The CWA withdrew their financial support after this legal loss, but UTW
maintained its nominal affiliation with the union.2 2 7 In the decades following
this second blow from the NLRB, UTW focused primarily on law and policy
issues unrelated to worker organizing in order to protect the rights of taxi
workers, shying away from ambitious attempts at organizing workers en
masse.

220.

Luxor Cab Co., No. 20-RC-16314, 31 (N.LR.B 1989).

221.

Interview with Charles Rathbone, San Francisco Taxi Worker, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 29,

2012).
222. At this moment, the Communication Workers of America had begun a campaign in "grey"
industries to mobilize independent contractor workers and fight for their employee status. The UTW was

one of many labor organizations that joined together with the CWA in this effort.
223. During this time, among many other things, the UTW and CWA fought against the issuance of
new permits in order to curtail competition and keep stable the income of taxi workers. Clifford O'Neill,
Permit Appeals Disaster Averted, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Mar.-

Apr. 1990, at 1. They also fought for the workers' compensation rights of taxi workers. Clifford O'Neill,
Workers Compensation and the Coleman Case, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab Workers, San
Francisco, Cal.), July-Aug. 1990, at 2. Most impressively, they mounted a major campaign to amend the

Motor Vehicle for Hire Regulations in San Francisco to guarantee employee rights for drivers if a majority
of drivers wanted to make the change. Clifford O'Neill, Tear Down the 'Lease' Wall!, UNITED TO WIN!

(United Taxicab Workers, San Francisco, Ca.), Dec. 1990-Jan. 1991, at 1. This change was embodied in
now-repealed S.F., Cal. Police Code, art. 16, div. 1, § 1124.5.
224.

UTW Announces Appointment of Cliff O'Neill as Coordinator, UNITED TO WIN! (United

Taxicab Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 5.
225.
226.

Interview with Mark Gruberg, supra note 213.
Ray Arthur, Anti-Worker Board Obstructs Election Drive, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab

Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 1.
227.

See supra note 10.
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The Regulatory Bargain

While putting organizing for widespread worker mobilization on the
back burner, the UTW continued to use law and municipal advocacy to
support drivers' interests, achieving an unprecedented municipal bargain.
Over the course of decades, UTW members and advocates pieced together
rights and regulations in an attempt to recreate the wage security and benefits
taxi workers had under the Chauffeurs' Union. In the courtroom, at the ballot
box, and in local regulatory and legislative bodies, UTW advanced the fight
for chauffeur worker security. The group also consistently issued an awardwinning quarterly newsletter, informing taxi workers throughout the industry
of the political maneuvering of taxicab companies, relevant changes and
happenings affecting the industry, and the work of the organization.2 2 8
An example of the tremendous lobbying efforts of UTW took place in
1995. That year, UTW advocates lobbied against AB 525, a Republicansponsored bill which would have exempted certain categories of workersamateur athletes, unpaid sports referees, volunteer ski patrol officers,
volunteers at private and non-profit agencies, and taxicab drivers-from
having access to workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, and
disability benefits, regardless of employment status.229 Risking termination,
UTW advocates testified against the legislation in front of their bosses,
including then Yellow Cab president Nathan Dwiri, who had spoken in favor
of the bill.230 Through its newsletter, UTW also encouraged taxi workers to
write to lawmakers to vote against the bill. 231 AB 525 was eventually
defeated.2 3 2

The following year, in 1997, UTW members procured some of those
benefits for San Francisco taxi workers through a major success in state
court.233 UTW members along with attorneys from the Legal Aid SocietyEmployment Law Center won a lawsuit against the city's three major taxicab
companies, Yellow Cab, Luxor, and DeSoto. 234 The lawsuit alleged that the
taxicab companies misclassified drivers as independent contractors for
purposes of workers' compensation and unemployment insurance and that
they illegally obtained security deposits from drivers before giving them

228.
UNITED TO WIN!, the UTW quarterly newsletter, won first prize for General Excellence in
Communications Workers of America's annual newsletter competition. UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab

Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Winter 1996-1997, at 2.
229.

Cab Companies Pushfor Bill to Deny Drivers Job Benefits, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab

Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Winter 1996, at 2.
230.

See id.

231.

Id.

232.

Id; State Senate Rejects Bill to Strip Driver Benefits, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab

Workers, San Francisco, Cal.) Winter 1996-1997, at 2.
233.

Tracy, supranote 115.

234.

Id.
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work.235 Joe Tracy, a UTW member, served as lead plaintiff and after five
years of grueling litigation, the drivers won on summary judgment.236
Two years later, in early 1998, UTW, fought for and won a municipallyenforced cap on the price of the daily lease, a regulation the likes of which
had not been achieved since the Chauffeurs' Union's advocacy during the
Great Depression. Following the precipitous rise of the daily lease that
drivers paid the taxicab companies for each shift, the UTW set out to obtain
municipal restraint on the matter.23 7 That year, Mayor Willie Brown called
for issuance of 500 taxi medallions, which, while making it easier for
consumers to get a cab, would also have increased competition for drivers.238
In response, UTW and other taxi workers mobilized, calling for expanded
regulatory control over how much they paid for each shift. 239 By fall of 1998,
300 new medallions were issued, but the city also enacted a lease cap as a
compromise. 24 0 This additional regulation meant that the city of San
Francisco controlled the price of the taxi fare, the price that taxi workers paid
for their daily lease, and the number of taxis on the street. Over the next
decade, UTW continued to influence municipal decisions on these matters to
maximize wage stability for taxi workers.
One hard-fought, but ultimately unsuccessful, UTW campaign was for
city-provided health insurance for taxi workers. The campaign reflected the
breadth of UTW's advocacy and vision, but also its limitations. Recognizing
that cab driving was one of the most dangerous occupations in the country,
UTW activists led by Ruach Graffis (also one of the Alliance founders) spent
4
In
years lobbying and strategizing for city-sponsored health insurance.2
2002, UTW authored and lobbied for a municipal ordinance that would
require the city to provide health insurance for taxicab drivers, consistent

235.

Id.; see also Complaint, Tracy v. Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc., No. 938786 (Cal. Super. Ct.

Oct. 22, 1996).
236.

Tracy, supranote 115. See also Yellow's Response to Tracy: Long-Term Leasing?, UNITED TO

WIN! (United Taxicab Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Winter 1996-1997, at 3. Without collective power,
many taxi workers were afraid of enforcing their rights to unemployment insurance and workers
compensation. However, every time Yellow Cab attempted to re-introduce security deposits over the next
20 years, UTW advocates reminded them of their obligations under Tracy. See, e.g., Morris Gray,
Company Now Requires 1-Shift Advance, But It May Receive PreviousDemand, UNITED TO WIN! (United

Taxicab Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Summer 2008, at 1. Since the impact of the TNCs on the taxi
industry, Luxor in 2016 tried-and failed- to get the decision rescinded. See supranote 10.
237.

See Drivers, Public CallforReform, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab Workers, San Francisco,

Cal.), Summer 1997, at 1, 6.
238.

Id. at 1.

239.

Gates Capped at $83.50 Average; Lease Fee Cap, Legislation on Employee Status Also

Approved, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Fall 1998, at 1.
240.

Id.

241.

Interview with Ruach Graffis, supra note 185.
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with a city feasibility study.2 42 The law passed.243 In 2007, after five years
of wrangling with regulators, city attorneys, and taxicab companies, a
municipal commission came up with a proposal that included a health and
welfare trust for San Francisco taxi workers.2 44 This 2007 proposal, which
the UTW supported, would have cost $11.6 million annually with cab drivers
shouldering 30% of the burden.245 In spite of significant lobbying efforts and
the municipal mandate, the plan never passed.24 6 Taxi workers continued to
labor in a dangerous occupation without health insurance.
One of the UTW's greatest successes over the course of many years was
in the fight against the privatization of medallions.2 47 In 1977, San Francisco
Supervisor Quentin Kopp authored a local proposition-Proposition K-to
make taxi medallions non-transferable, non-monetary city licenses that
would only be issued to active taxi drivers.248 Supervisor Kopp believed that
the for-profit medallion system was creating inequities for taxi workers and
corruption within the taxi industry. Proposition K drew the ire of taxicab
companies and other business interests who wanted to purchase and sell
medallions on the open market. 249 Nevertheless, the San Francisco electorate
spoke, and the proposition became law2 50
In the post-union world, the Proposition K system offered economic
protection to older drivers who began referring to the medallion as their
"pension." Taxi workers who had put themselves on a medallion-waiting list
and driven consistently in San Francisco for about fifteen years were
eventually issued a medallion by the city.2 5' In order to continue to hold a
medallion, these taxi workers had to work 800 hours per year. When they

242.
Ruach Graffis, Health Care Plan on its Way at Last, UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab
Workers, San Francisco, Cal.), Winter 2007, at 1, 4.
243. Id.
244. Health Plan Proposal Gets Board Hearing,UNITED TO WIN! (United Taxicab Workers, San
Francisco, Cal.), Fall 2007, at 1. This health proposal was drawn from a report written by academics at
the UC Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education. The commissioned report states, "This report
represents several years of efforts by policymakers to develop reliable information on realistic alternatives
for providing health insurance benefits for San Francisco taxi drivers. In response to requests from the

San Francisco Board of Supervisors and the City Controller, DPH and SFHP engaged in a detailed study
to determine the cost of providing health insurance to taxi drivers, and to develop models for financing

the coverage." Rhonda Evans, Jabril Bensedrine, Ken Jacobs & Carol Zabin, Establishinga San Francisco
Taxi DriverHealth Care Coverage Program:Administration, Cost, and Funding Options, Report for the

S.F. Dep't of Health (Mar. 2006), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2006/taxidriver healthcare06.pdf.
245.

See Health Plan Proposal Gets BoardHearing, supra note 244.

246.

Interview with Ruach Graffis, supranote 185.

247. Described supraat 19, medallions are literally a piece of tin placed inside a vehicle, authorizing
the vehicle to operate as a taxicab. Medallions are distinguished from A-Cards, which are professional
licenses that individual taxi drivers must attain to drive a taxicab.
248.
See Machen & Thigpen, supra note 138.
249.
Id.
250.

Id.

251.

See supra note 10.
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founder and UTW advocate Ruach Graffis put it, "We ha[d] to negotiate
every fucking thing in our universe in public with the politicians and in the
ballot box because we can't have a union because we can't have a contract
because we are so-called 'independent contractors."'25 7
IV.
FROM TAXI WORK TO UBER WORK: ORGANIZED LABOR, DEREGULATION,
AND AN ILLUSORY BARGAIN (2013-PRESENT)

Following the decades of low but relatively stable wages maintained
through regulation of rates and competition and accomplished through
painstaking advocacy, the UTW and San Francisco taxi workers at large
encountered a situation that they could not have predicted: the promulgation
of worker precarity enacted-almost overnight-through new chauffeur
company business models and subsequent deregulation.
Between 2012 and 2013, the next-generation of taxicabs emerged on the
streets in the form of private vehicles. New chauffeur companies, Uber, Lyft,
and Sidecar branded themselves as technology start-ups and enabled drivers
to operate extra-legally, outside the state and municipal regulatory
frameworks of for-hire vehicles. These companies enlisted an unrestricted
number of commercially unlicensed drivers to download a centralized
dispatch application on their smartphones and to use their personal vehicles
to pick up and drop off passengers.258
These business models were one-step removed from the taxicab leasing
models enacted in the late 1970s. Under the taxi leasing apparatus, the taxi
workers were independent contractors who paid to work. But they drove
company cars with commercial insurance and labored in an industry in which
competition was regulated. By contrast, the new chauffeur companies
operated illegally, outside the context of existing regulations, and demanded
that workers utilize their own vehicles and bear all the associated financial
and legal risks.
In the nascent years of these new chauffeur companies, UTW and other
workers' rights groups and advocates engaged in fervent protests and
lobbying of both municipal and state agencies to put an end to what they
called "bandit tech cabs." 25 9 In 2013, UTW advocates complained that taxi
workers' already low wages had dropped by up to 65% because of the
competition created by the uncapped number of chauffeur vehicles suddenly
257. Interview with Ruach Graffis, supra note 185.
258. See supra note 10. Notably, many of these unlicensed drivers were underemployed or
unemployed following the economic upheaval of 2008-2009. Id
259. In a 2013 op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle, I used the term "bandit tech cab," which I
borrowed from UTW leaders, to argue for regulatory enforcement. Veena Dubal, "Bandit Cabs "Are Bad
for Drivers and Passengers, " S.F. CHRONICLE (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/
openforum/article/Bandit-cabs-are-bad-for-drivers-and-passengers-4747566.php.
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on the streets. 260 Despite impassioned taxi driver protests and push back from
existing taxi companies, state policymakers in 2015 legalized the platformbased chauffeur business models, rebuffing workers' rights concerns and
heralding the new companies for their consumer convenience and
technological innovation.26 1
State regulators decreed that these new technology-based chauffeur
companies were not taxicab businesses, but something new entirely:
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs).262 Articulating a desire not to
"stifle innovation," state regulators refused to enforce or replicate the longestablished and hard-won regulations of the taxi industry. 263 Though wage
security for taxi workers had, since the late 1970s, depended on set fares and
restrictions on competition, regulators declined to address either issue when
it came to TNCs. 264 The limited TNC regulations (almost all of which
addressed consumer safety) allocated the role long played by city regulators
to the TNCs themselves. Critically, the companies were granted the power
to control the number of available cars and the fares that consumers were
charged.
With the innovation and legalization of the TNCs, early twenty-first
century San Francisco chauffeur work rapidly began to resemble early
twentieth century, pre-union San Francisco chauffeur work. Much like the
taxi workers who struck in San Francisco in 1919, the TNC drivers had no
set income, paid for their own gasoline, and drove with no regulatory limit
on competition. 265 As an additional regression, the TNC drivers also had to
drive their own cars, bear the costs of wear and tear, purchase gas and
insurance, 2 66 and pay for vehicle upkeep. By operating illegally and then
260.

Supra note 10.

261. For the codified regulations, see Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public
Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry. California Public Utilities
at
Available
2013.
23,
Sept.
12-12-011.
Making
Rule
Commission
http://does.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/GOOO/MO77/Kl92/77192335.PDF
262. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, supra note 21 (codifying rules ultimately
passed). This term later became used by the media and by regulators across the nation. See supra note 10.
263. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order Instituting Rulemaking, http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/

PublishedDocs/Published/G000/MO36/K204/36204017.PDF (encouraging innovators); see also Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, supranote 21 (codifying rules ultimately passed).
264.

See supra note 10.

265.

Id. While workers across the chauffeur industry continued to struggle to make ends meet, Uber

was subsequently valued at $68 billion. Liyan Chen, At $68 Billion Valuation, Uber Will Be Bigger Than
GM, Ford, & Honda, FORBES.COM (Dec. 4,2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/12/04/at68-billion-valuation-uber-will-be-bigger-than-gm-ford-and-honda/.
At the outset, the TNC drivers were bearing extraordinary financial risk for operating their
266.
personal vehicles commercially without the appropriate commercial insurance. See supra note 10.
Insurance companies stated that if their clients were driving for a TNC on personal insurance, then their

insurance policy would be automatically invalidated. Id. In late 2015, insurance companies began
offering "hybrid" personal and commercial insurance policies targeted at TNC drivers. See, e.g., Mark
Vallet, Which Insurers Offer Ridesharing Policies?, INSURANCECOM (Dec. 14, 2016),
http://www.insurance.com/auto-insurance/coverage/insurance-rideshare-uber-lyft.html.

However, in my
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successfully lobbying for legalization with limited consumer safety
regulation, TNCs in San Francisco produced a new, but old, version of taxi
work.

While UTW-and eventually its successor the San Francisco Taxi
Workers Alliance (SFTWA)-continued to fight for regulation of the TNC
industry, labor unions also began to respond to the needs of the TNC workers.
As the technology-enabled contractor business model spread to other
industries and to other parts of the country, labor unions engaged in
conversations about how to address this type of contingent labor. In early
2016, labor splintered over strategy. Some unions and alt-labor groups,
including the SFTWA, National Taxi Workers Alliance (NTWA), and the
national AFL-CIO, believed that the best route to address the rise of the
precarious work was to fight for the employee status of TNC drivers.2 67
Others sought a more contentious and expedient route-accepting the
independent contractor status of workers and establishing non-union worker
associations.2 6 8

In the San Francisco area, the Teamsters Joint Council 7 ("TJC7")
answered the provision of a proposed misclassification class action
settlement with Uber which provided for the creation of an Uber-funded
"worker association" of Uber drivers.269 One day after the proposed
settlement was publicly announced, TJC7 articulated their intention to
become that association. 270 This method-establishing a worker association
absent NLRB recognition-stirred intense discord among chauffeur workers
and other labor unions.2 7 1

While both tactics-seeking employment status and building Uberfunded worker associations-operated simultaneously, how to address the
precarious working conditions of the tech-enabled chauffeur drivers became
a national concern.272 Taking into account the growing apprehension about
research, most Uber drivers say that these hybrid policies are prohibitively expensive so they continue to
drive under their personal insurance policy, risking complete liability in the case of an accident in which
they are found at fault. See supra note 10.
267.

Id.

268.

Id.

269. Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, Teamsters Recruiting Uber DriversAfter Settlement of Employee
Lawsuit, S.F. EXAMINER (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.sfexaminer.com/teamsters-recruiting-uber-driverssettlement-employee-lawsuit/.
270. Riley McDermid, Uber Picks Up a New Passenger: The Teamsters, S.F. Bus. TIMES. (Apr. 26,
2016),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2016/04/uber-drivers-lyft-teamsters-techshuttle.html.
271. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, On Demand & Demanding Their Rights, AM. PROSPECT (June
28, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/demand-and-demanding-their-rights.
272. For example, eight months after the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission Chair Jenny
Yang attended a symposium at the University of California at Berkeley co-sponsored by this journal and
focused on precarious workers in the tech economy (specifically TNC drivers), the EEOC announced its
decision to make discrimination in the so-called "gig economy" a strategic focus. Kevin McGowan, New
EEOC Plan Targets Anti-Muslim Bias, Gig Workers, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 18, 2016),
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tech-enabled contractor work, which originated in the San Francisco taxi
industry, this final section examines how chauffeur work became deregulated
in the city and explores the contours of labor's schismatic response.
A.

The Emergence of the TNCs & New, but Old, Taxi Work

In March 2009, amidst the Great Recession, the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors dissolved the city's Taxi Commission, a municipal body charged
The San Francisco Municipal
with regulating the taxi industry.273
Transportation Agency (SFMTA) took the wheel of the city's taxi industry.274
Mayor Gavin Newsom, a socially progressive Democrat who was later
elected Lieutenant Governor of California, announced his intention to
privatize medallions in order to generate revenue for the cash-strapped city.275
Notwithstanding raucous protests and pushback from UTW and nonprofits representing the interests of low-income workers, San Francisco's
thirty-year policy was reversed and medallions were conferred monetary

http://www.bna.com/new-eeoc-plan-n57982078766/. Even President Barack Obama in his comments at
the White House Summit on Worker Voice reflected his concern that in the "on-demand" economy

occupied by Uber and Lyft, hard work and economic security become decoupled. He stated, "We've got
folks who are getting a paycheck driving for Uber or Lyft; people who are cleaning other people's houses
through Handy; offering their skills on TaskRabbit. And so there's flexibility and autonomy and
opportunity for workers. And millennials love working their phones much quicker than I can. And all
this is promising. But if the combination of globalization and automation undermines the capacity of the

ordinary worker and the ordinary family to be able to support themselves, if employers are able to use
these factors to weaken workers' voices and give them a take-it-or-leave-it deal in which they don't have

a chance to ever save for the kind of retirement they're looking for, if we don't refashion the social
compact so that workers are able to be rewarded properly for the labor that they put in . . . then we're
going to have problems. And it's not just going to be a problem for our politics-creating resentment and
anxiety-it's going be a problem for our economy because the history shows that when we do best as an
economy it's when workers have money in their pockets and they're able to buy goods and services... So
we've got to make sure that as we continue to move forward, both in this new 'on demand' economy and
in the traditional economy as a whole, hard work guarantees some security." Remarks by the Presidentat
(Oct. 7, 2015),
the White House Summit on Worker Voices, THE WHITE HOUSE
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/07/remarks-president-white-house-summitworker-voice.
273.

Proposition

K

Reform,

S.F.

METROPOLITAN

TRANSP.

AUTHORITY,

https://www.sfnta.com/projects-planning/projects/proposition-k-reform (last visited: Dec. 16, 2016).
Regulation of the taxi industry has long been a thorn in the side of San Francisco's elected officials. Due
to the complicated nature of the industry and the number of interested parties (drivers, medallion holders,

company owners, hotel owners, dispatch companies, consumers, etc.), Mayor Willie Brown (himself a
taxi driver earlier in his career) created a Taxi Commission through a voter-approved charter amendment
in 1998. Board. of SupervisorsAgenda and Minutes Archive, CITY AND CNTY. OF S.F. (May 18, 1998),

http://sfbos.org/ftp/meetingarchive/fullboard/index.aspx-page=2712.html.
274. The primary purpose of the SFMTA is to regulate the bus system. During the November 2007
elections, San Francisco voters passed Proposition A. This proposition concerned bus regulation, but

included a brief provision on page thirty-six of the text expanding the role of the San Francisco Municipal
Transportation Agency (SFMTA) in making "taxi-related regulations" in the event that the taxi regulatory

body, the Taxi Commission, was merged with the SFMTA. See supranote 10.
Erin Allday, Mayor ProposesAuctioning S.F. Taxi Medallions, S.F. GATE (Jan. 13, 2009),
275.
3
176782.php.
http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Mayor-proposes-auctioning-S-F-taxi-medallions-

:Jx

di

m

$2 5(J
pay it

f

ret month

mrioui

2~rupt ih~

md

Ii2xfP~
I<I)

Ir
iii

THE DRIVE TO PRECARITY

2017]

125

arranged carrier but as an illegal taxi service. On October 20, 2010, the
SFMTA issued an unenforced cease and desist order to UberCab for
operating without authorization.2 81
Though UberCab was threatened with up to $5,000 per instance of
illegal operation and jail time, the company defiantly continued to function,
dropping the word "cab" from its name to buttress the argument that it was
different from taxicab companies.2 82 In July 2012, Uber expanded to create
UberX, in which any private driver could download their app and begin to
284
drive commercially. 283 Lyft and Sidecar were founded the same year.
Together, these companies claimed that they were entirely exempt from
285
regulation because the service they provided was a form of "ride-sharing."
Like their taxicab company predecessors who embraced the leasing model in
the late 1970s, Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar passed the financial and legal risks
onto worker drivers.
As more and more UberXs flooded the streets of San Francisco, the
value of the privatized taxi medallion plummeted.2 86 Taxi drivers who had
just scrounged up loans and savings to purchase medallions put themselves
on a long list to sell their medallions.287 Yet to appease taxicab companies
who complained that they could not compete with the new companies, the
SFMTA issued even more. Soon, however, many taxi drivers flocked to

281.

Lora Kolodny, UberCab, Now Just Uber, Shares Cease and Desist Orders, TECHCRUCH (Oct.

25, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/10/25/ubercab-now-just-uber-shares-cease-and-desist-orders/.
Lora Kolodny, UberCab Ordered to Cease and Desist, TECHCRUCH (Oct. 24, 2010),
282.
https://techcrunch.com/2010/10/24/ubercab-ordered-to-cease-and-desist/.
283. Alexia Tsotsis, Uber Opens up Platform to Non-Limo Vehicles With "UberX,"Service Will Be

35% Less Expensive, TechCrunch (Jul. 1, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/07/01/uber-opens-upplatform-to-non-limo-vehicles-with-uber-x-service-will-be-35-less-expensive/.
284. Kirsten Korosec, Lyft Co-Founder John Zimmer Has a Message for the Auto Industry,
FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/17/lyft-john-zimmer-la-auto-show/; Jennifer Van

Grove & Tracey Lien, It's the End of the Road for Sidecar, L.A. TIMES (Oct 30, 2015),
2
http://www.1atimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-sidecar-quits-ridehailing- 0151229-story.html.
285.

Daniel Rothberg, UberX, Lyft Reject Latest CaliforniaRegulation Push, THE SACRAMENTO

CPUC
BEE (Jun. 17, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-govemment/article2601601.html.
regulations exempted not-for-profit ridesharing in which drivers gave a free ride to persons going in the
same direction. See supra note 10. To fit this definition, Lyft and Sidecar called the payment exchanged
between a driver and passenger a "donation." But the "donation" was charged automatically unless the
passenger overrode it. Erin Huet, How Ride-Share Services Skirt Taxi Rules, S.F. CHRONICLE (Sep. 2,

66
.php.
2012), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/How-ride-share-services-skirt-taxi-rules-38355
286. In 2010, medallions were sold for $250,000 in San Francisco, and there was a long waitlist of
drivers hoping to buy the medallions. See Jesse Gamier, SF Taxi Medallions Now up for Sale, SFBAY.CA
(Aug. 23, 2012), https://sfbay.ca/2012/08/23/san-francisco-taxi-medallions-now-up-for-sale/. As of May
2016, the city of San Francisco had a list of 766 medallion-holders seeking to sell their medallions. That

last grew from 500 in December 2015. Peter Kirby, San FranciscoMedallion Programand the Damage
Done. S.F. EXAMINER, May 1, 2016, http://www.sfexaminer.com/san-franciscos-medallion-program-

damage-done/.
287.

See supranote 10
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become Uber drivers, and taxicab companies-small and large-discovered
that they could not fill their shifts.2 88
At the outset, TNCs maintained that they were not technically
transportation companies because they were not providing vehicles to the
independent contractor drivers.2 89 Instead, TNCs argued that they were
software companies and therefore not subject to regulation by the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) or the SFMTA.2 90 The companies
claimed that while the drivers may have been operating illegally, they, as
software companies, were not in violation of the law.2 91 In October 2012, the
CPUC issued cease and desist orders to Lyft and SideCar, arguing that they
were not properly licensed.2 92 In November 2012, the CPUC tried to enforce
its orders against the companies by issuing $20,000 citations to each.2 93
Then, just one month later, the CPUC halted all enforcement attempts 294 and
commenced a rule-making proceeding on the operation and regulation of all
three companies.2 95
B. The Story ofDeregulation
Despite the great protest and lawsuits by taxi companies 296 who could no
longer fill their shifts, and the economic insecurity of taxi workers who could
288.

Id. Indeed, in early 2016, San Francisco Yellow Cab went bankrupt. Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez,

Yellow Cab to Filefor Bankruptcy, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 6, 2016, http://www.sfexaminer.com/yellow-

cab-to-file-for-bankruptcy/.
289.

See supra note 10.

290. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, supra note 21, at 15.
291. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, Reply Comments of the Taxicab
Paratransit Association ("TPAC"), http://sfcda.org/CPUC/TPAC_reply_PD.pdf.
292.
Ryan Lawler, While the CaliforniaPUC Cracks Down on Ride-Sharing, Sidecar and Lyft
Commit to Staying on the Road, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 8, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/10/08/cpuc-

ride-sharing-c-and-d/.
293. Bryan Bishop, Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar Hit with $20,000 Citationsfrom CaliforniaUtilities
Commission, THE VERGE (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.theverge.com/2012/11/14/3647170/uber-lyftsidecar-20000-fines-califomia-public-utilities-commission.
294.
Indeed, Uber reached a non-monetary "settlement' with the Safety and Enforcement Division
of the CPUC. The settlement provided that while the rule-making period was in process, Uber would
abide by a limited set of rules. Term Sheet for Settlement Between the Safety & Enforcement Division of

the

CPUC

&

Uber

Technologies,

CAL.

PUB.

UTIL.

COMM'N

(Jan

30,

2013),

http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCPublicWebsite/Content/Safety/Transportation Enforce
mentand Licensing/EnforcementActions TransportationNetworkCompanies/UberTermSheetforSet
tlement.pdf.

295. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, supranote 21, at 4.
296. The Taxicab Paratransit Association of California (TPAC), which is a taxi company interest
group, filed an application for a rehearing of the CPUC's decision on TNC rule-making on a number of
grounds. One claim was that the CPUC illegally legalized TNCs before conducting an environmental
impact report. Another was that the CPUC erred in assigning TNCs their own legal category separate
from taxi companies, arguing that TNCs are, essentially, taxi companies. See generally, Application of

the Taxicab Paratransit Association of California (TPAC) for Rehearing of Decision 13-09-045, Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, http://www.taxi-library.org/cpuc-2013/rehearing-application-tpac.pdf (last viewed: Dec.
16, 2016).
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no longer earn a living in a climate of such unbridled competition, the CPUC
legalized TNCs in September 2013.297 Because these start-ups began in San
Francisco, the SFMTA and CPUC were the first regulatory bodies
nationwide to respond to the companies' disruption of the existing industry.
The rules that the CPUC enacted allowed drivers to remain commercially
unlicensed, outsourced the responsibility for safety regulations to the
companies, and put no limitations on fare rates or on the number of operating
vehicles.298
In its order instituting the rule-making process, the CPUC made clear
that their primary goals in regulating the new TNCs were to ensure public
safety and to not stifle innovation. 29 9 Concerns about worker security and
well-being were notably absent from the enumerated goals of the rulemaking.
The commission released a carefully worded statement,
repackaging a familiar narrative about these companies as innovative and
desirable:
The Commission has a responsibility for determining whether and how public
safety might be affected by these new businesses. The purpose of this
Rulemaking is not to stifle innovation and the provision of new services that
consumers want, but rather to assess public safety risks, and to ensure that

the safety of the public is not compromised in the operation of these new

business models. 300

After several meetings with interested parties, including intensive advocacy
by the UTW, the CPUC issued its first phase of regulations.30' Despite UTW
and the SFMTA's advocacy efforts, the CPUC's permissive regulations
essentially deregulated the industry.
The TNCs, the CPUC decided, were only required to apply for company
permits in order to operate in the state of California, but the individual drivers
who drove for the TNCs were not required to register with the state or obtain
commercial licenses. 302 Trivial safety regulations were promulgated, but in
most instances, the duty to ensure compliance was outsourced to the
companies, rather than enforced by the state.3 03 In the taxicab industry
context, analogous municipal regulations had long been enforced by city
regulators, providing leverage for independent contractor taxi workers to
advocate for themselves on related issues. But in the TNC context, the CPUC
rules required that the TNCs enforce the rules on drivers and provide
See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, supra note 21.
See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, supranote 21.
See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule 12-12-011, Order Instituting Rulemaking on Regulations
299.
Relating to Passenger Carriers, Ridesharing, and New Online-Enabled Transportation Services, at I
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.taxi-library.org/epuc-2013/oir.pdf.
300. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
301. See supra note 10.
302. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, supra note 21, at 26-27.
303. See id. at 29-33.
297.

298.
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verification of compliance on an annual basis. 304 Most glaringly, the rate of
rides and the number of vehicles permitted to operate were left completely
unregulated.305 The fragile era of sustaining a regulatory bargain had ended.
The CPUC anticipated that these rules would need revisiting and ordered a
second phase of rule-making.306
Two years later, in April 2016, the CPUC voted on phase II of the TNC
rule-making process, and again, the new regulations, rather than placing
limitations on the companies, expanded the possibilities of their business
models-at the workers' expense. For example, the CPUC approved the
practice of fare-splitting for TNC carpool services, a practice that TNC
drivers disliked because it forced them to drive further for less money.307 The
only new regulations were imposed on TNC drivers, not the companies.308 In
addition to the municipalities' reluctance to regulate TNCs on top of the
CPUC regulations, the California legislature also failed to pass laws that
would place any regulatory burden on the TNCs or provide drivers leverage
to advocate on their own behalf.309
The resulting unregulated competition effectively undermined both
TNC and taxi workers' ability to earn a living as independent contractors.
TNC and taxicab drivers remain outside the protections of employment and
labor law, including collective bargaining and minimum wage laws.3"0 With

304.
See id. Uber has taken a recalcitrant approach to these reporting mandates. In January 2016, the
CPUC fined the company over $7.6 million for failure to meet the reporting requirements. Annie Gans,

Uber Slapped with $7.6 Million CPUC Fine for 'Contempt," Non-Compliance, THE Bus. Js. (Jan. 14,
2016, 1:24 PM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2016/01/uber-7-6-millioncpuc-fine-reporting.html. The company paid the fine, and appealed the decision in California Superior
Court. Id
305.

Id.

306.

See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Rule Making 12-12-011, supranote 21, at 18.

307.

See id at 4.

308.
This included new rules mandating that drivers obtain inspections for their personal vehicles
every year or every 50,000 miles and that they display removable trade dress in the front and the back of

the vehicles. Id. at 2-3.
309.

For example, in response to the TNC work, Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez introduced and

then pulled AB 1727, a bill that would have allowed independent contractors who obtained their work
through a platform to engage in protected collective bargaining. Press Release, Assemblywoman Lorena

Gonzalez, Gonzalez Proposes New Workplace Rights for Independent Contractors (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://asmdc.org/members/a80/news-room/press-releases/gonzalez-proposes-new-workplace-rights-forindependent-contractors. Gonzalez's aids reported that it was pulled because they did not have enough

labor support to pass the bill.
310.
See supranote 10. Anecdotally, a number of taxi workers in my research have stated that TNC
drivers tend to leave the industry after four months because of the physical and mental difficulties of the
work, the unstable income, and the wear and tear on their cars. Id. While their income is curtailed by the
lack of regulation regarding the number of TNC vehicles in operation, this same lack of regulation ensures

that TNCs' profitability is unbridled. Id.

THE DRIVE TO PRECARITY

2017]1

129

the onset of deregulation, leverage that taxi workers once had at a municipal
level to curtail supply and effect a stable wage evaporated overnight."'
C. Labor's Schismatic Response to Deregulation
In February 2014, the National Taxi Worker Alliance, which is affiliated
with the AFL-CIO, coordinated a phone conference of taxi workers and
organizers all over the country, including those from the United Taxicab
Workers.312 In addition to discussing their frustration over the lost taxi
income and regulatory battles brought on by the TNCs, which by that time
had spread all over the world, taxi workers and organizers also relayed a
startling fact: TNC drivers were coming to them for protection."' TNC
drivers, many of them former taxi workers, had come back to the organizers
whom they knew in the taxi industry, asking what they could do to organize
against their exploitative conditions.314
In the months before and after this call, taxi worker protests and TNC
worker protests against the TNCs proliferated across the United States and
worldwide."' In San Francisco, taxi workers from different organizations,
including the UTW, resolved their differences and united under a single
umbrella organization-the San Francisco Taxi Workers Alliance (SFTWA).
Reeling against the threat posed by the TNCs, over one third of taxi drivers
in San Francisco signed their allegiance to the SFTWA, which became
formally affiliated with the NTWA and the AFL-CIO. Amidst the
deregulation, the SFTWA organized protests and spearheaded extraordinary
lobbying efforts.31 6

Id. Meanwhile, taxi medallions purchased in 2009 were rendered nearly worthless. As of the
311.
time of publication, the SFMTA has a list of hundreds of medallion holders who want to sell their
medallions. But as no buyers exist, the list grows longer and longer. As of May 2016, the city of San
Francisco had a list of 766 medallion-holders seeking to sell their medallions. That last grew from 500 in
December 2015. Peter Kirby, San FranciscoMedallion Program and the DamageDone, S.F. EXAMINER
(May 1, 2016), http://www.sfexaminer.com/san-franciscos-medallion-program-damage-done/.
312. See supra note 10. The National Taxi Workers Alliance emerged from the successful labor
organizing of the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("NYTWA") which enacted a number of successful
work stoppages and policy campaigns over the course of two decades organizing independent contractor
taxi workers in New York City. For more on the NYTWA, see Mathew, supra note 63. In 2011, the
AFL-CIO gave an organizing charter to the National Taxi Workers Alliance. See Press Release, AFLCIO, National Taxi Workers Alliance Affiliates with the AFL-CIO (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.aflcio.org/Press-Room/Press-Releases/National-Taxi-Workers-Alliance-Affiliates-with-the.
313.

See supra note 10.

314.

Id.
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Id.
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unionization and the right to collectively bargain under the existing NLRA
laws. 3 2 1 Other unions and alt-labor groups, however, were more willing to
relinquish the employee status battle and represent drivers for purposes of
"driver voice" and potential market-based benefits.322
As part of a proposed settlement in a major misclassification lawsuit
against Uber-the TNC with the most workers-Uber agreed to fund a
drivers' association to address the concerns of workers.32 3 Objectors to the
settlement, including a San Francisco-based worker group guided by the
maintained that such an association
National Taxi Workers Alliance,
would be, in effect, a "company union," and would undermine independent
worker organizing.325 These plaintiff objectors claimed that they had waited
three years for this case to determine their correct worker classification and
any settlement that fell short of conferring employee status was
undesirable.32 6
However, as soon as the terms of the proposed settlement were
announced, Teamsters Joint Council 7327 (TJC7), whose offices are in
Northern California, issued a press release articulating their intention to
fulfill the role of the anticipated worker association.32 8 Unlike the traditional
collective bargaining path, which involves organizing drivers, filing for
recognition with the NLRB, and then forcing a company to bargain, TJC7
329
made the unusual decision to try to contract directly with the company.
Within weeks, TJC7 assigned a staff organizer to the TNC driver
association.3 30 The union had two open meetings with drivers during the

321.

See Greenhouse,supra note 272.

322.

Id.

323. Motion for Preliminary Approval. O'Connorv. Uber Technologies, CV 13-03826-EMC, Doc.
518 (Apr. 21, 2016), 10. Such an association, funded and facilitated by Uber, could have faced legal
challenges under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act which outlaws company unions (if
drivers were found to be employees). See 28 U.S.C. § 158 8(a)(2) (2012).
324.
325.

The group was represented by this author.
Declaration of Veena Dubal in Support of Objections to Class Settlement, at 7-10, O'Connor

v. Uber Tech. Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC No. 15-cv-00262 EMC, 2016 WL 4398271 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
18, 2016).
326. Id. at 16-17.
327.

This Teamsters joint council represents workers in Northern California, California's Central

Valley, and Northern Nevada. In the 1990s, TJC7 spearheaded the fight against the misclassification of
port truck drivers. Their efforts largely failed to classify these drivers as employees. See supranote 10.
328. As the Teamsters Joint Council 7 political director Douglas Bloch told me, "The earlier strategy
of the Teamsters [with independent contractor truckers] was to make workers employees first, but that is
not going to be our strategy here [with the TNC workers]. I don't see this business model changing anytime

soon, and in the meantime, the drivers need help." Interview with Douglas Bloch, supra note 320.
329.

Id.

330.

See supra note 10. Teamsters also announced their intention to partner with Silicon Valley

Rising to coordinate this campaign and eventual worker association. The Silicon Valley Rising coalition
specifically targets the inequalities created by the tech industry. Their website states, "Silicon Valley
Rising is taking on occupational segregation and severe income inequality with a comprehensive
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summer of 2016 but continued to worry about the financial implications of
fighting for a wage floor. 33' Later that summer, the proposed settlement (and
with it the proposed drivers' association) was rejected as "not fair, adequate,
and reasonable." 33 2 Whether TJC7 will continue to work with TNC drivers
and support them in organizing efforts remains to be seen.
Prior to the court's rejection of the settlement, the Teamsters' political
director, Douglas Bloch, said they would not organize the workers for wage
purposes out of fear of anti-trust liability. Mr. Bloch stated:
The earlier strategy of Teamsters [in misclassification contexts] was to make
them employees first, but that is not going to be our strategy here. I don't see
this business model changing anytime soon, and in the meantime, the drivers
need help. They are militant; they want to organize. And if this settlement
says that they are going to recognize some kind of association and steer
resources to it, then we want drivers to organize.333
Just days after TJC7 announced its attention to be the drivers'
association laid out by the proposed settlement in O'Connor v. Uber3 34
another labor union and alt-labor group-both based in New York Cityrevealed that they too were going to accept resources from Uber to assist
workers.3 The labor union-the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers Union (AFL-CIO)-formed a five-year pact with
Uber. The Machinists created the Independent Drivers Guild (IDG) to
represent the TNC drivers, but they agreed with Uber not to bargain over a
contract that would stipulate fares, benefits, or protections.3 6 They also
agreed to refrain from trying to unionize drivers, from encouraging them to
strike, and from waging legal and political campaigns to change their
employment status. Instead, the IDG would work to create an appeals
process for deactivated drivers and provide members with discounted legal
services.337 in response to labor activists who called the Machinists'
campaign to raise wages, create affordable housing and build a tech economy that works for everyone."
SILICON VALLEY RIsING, http://siliconvalleyrising.org/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
331. See supra note 10.
332. Order Denying Plaintiff s Motion for Preliminary Approval, O'Connor v. Uber Technologies,
Case No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, Doc. 748 at 64 (Aug. 18, 2016).
333. Interview with Douglas Bloch, supranote 320.
334. Caroline O'Donovan, Teamsters To Organize CaliforniaUberDriversAssociation, BUZZFEED
(Apr. 22, 2016) https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/teamsters-to-organize-uber-drivers-incalifornia.
335. Machinists Union Announces Association For Uber Drivers, BUSINESSWIRE (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160426006062/en/Machinists-Union-AnnouncesAssociation-Uber-Drivers; see also Caroline O'Donovan, Worker Advocacy Group Will ProfitFrom Uber
Deal, BUZZFEED (May 11, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/uber-adds-workeradvocacy-group-to-its-payroll.
336. Noam Scheiber & Mike Isaac, Uber Recognizes New York Drivers' Group, Short of a Union,
N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/1 1/technology/uber-agrees-to-union-dealin-new-york.html.
337.

Id.
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agreement with Uber a "historic betrayal,"" an attorney for the Machinists
defended the move, arguing that his union "had to adopt to this new
economy." 33 9 Uber for its part defended the IDG, maintaining that the
drivers' group would create better communications and workplace voice for
drivers.340 Had the proposed settlement been judicially sanctified, Uber
would likely have pushed for a similar deal with TJC7 in Northern California.
The alt-labor group that struck a deal with Uber-the Freelancers
Union 34 1 -agreed to serve as a consultant for the company to create portable
market-based benefits for drivers across the country, including in San
Francisco. Rather than challenging the precarious work produced by Uber's
business model, the creation of these benefits may appease political critique
about the precarious work created by the TNCs. If worker-funded, marketdriven "benefits" were available to drivers-no matter the drivers' pecuniary
ability or inability to purchase these benefits-then the responsibilities to
produce secure work would fall away from both Uber and the state. Drivers,
who are not guaranteed even a minimum wage under the Uber model, would
then be responsible for buying their own unemployment insurance and
workers' compensation plans, in addition to their own cars, gasoline, phones,
and hybrid insurance policies.
Still, the limited goals of these worker associations-workplace voice
and market-based portable benefits-appear to be incremental improvements
in the insecure working conditions of chauffeur drivers. But the Uberpromoted mechanism by which these improvements would be achievedemployer-sponsored worker associations-have historically had a negative
impact on independent worker organizing and may interfere with the right of
workers to independently collectively bargain. Prior to the passage of the
NLRA, similar employer representation associations were part of an arsenal
of tactics to undermine independent worker organizing.342 Such "company
unions" were subsequently outlawed by the NLRA to preserve the ability of
workers to make choices and decisions independent of their employers'
influence.3 4 3 Indeed, if the NLRB finds that Uber drivers are employees

338. Daniel Wiessner & Dan Levine, Uber Deal Shows Divide in Labor's Drive ForRole in "Gig
Economy, " REUTERS (May 23, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-drivers-laboridUSKCN0YEODF.
339.

Id.

Id.
341. The Freelancers Union is a non-profit advocated on behalf of independent contractors that was
launched by Sara Horowitz in 2001. Because they are not a "union" under the NLRA, the Freelancers
Union cannot engage in collective bargaining. Instead, their primary form of advocacy has been to create
portable benefits for their members. See supra note 10.
342. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition:The
Casefor PartialRepeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 125 (Apr. 1994).
343. Id. Senator Wagner referred to company unions as "sham[s]," "masquerades," and "pretend
union[s]" and argued that company-supported systems could not secure democratic consent and
340.
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under the NLRA344 , the TJC7 and Machinists' worker associations would be
illegal.345
In the interim, however, these union and alt-labor tactics exist alongside
other small, independent groups of Uber drivers organizing for better
conditions.346 Without employment status or regulatory leverage, TNC
worker activists-both working with and without union support-struggle to
advance changes in their work lives. Through new technology-driven
business models, deregulation, and some labor unions' de-radicalized
approach to organizing, San Francisco chauffeur work has been undone as
secure work.
CONCLUSION

This Article tells the long and complex story of how San Francisco
chauffeur work evolved from insecure work, to secure work, and then back
to insecure work, all in just over a hundred years. Chauffeur workers' in the
early 2 0 th century San Francisco taxi industry achieved security through
militant organizing and bargaining practices that sought to influence not just
wages and hours, but also, crucially, business models and municipal
regulations. Beginning in the 1950s and continuing into the late 1970s, a
combination of racial and political conflicts within the Union collided with
successful attempts by chauffeur businesses to evade work laws, rendering
San Francisco taxi workers de-unionized.
Nevertheless, with strong
regulations of the industry in place, worker activists from the 1980s to the
early 2010s triangulated their advocacy around the price of fares, the price of
rents, and limited control over competition to fight for a decent wage. Since
2013, with the loss of both collective bargaining rights and regulations
limiting competition and stabilizing fares, chauffeur workers in the San
Francisco taxi and Uber economies face a new-but familiar-state of risk
and insecurity.

cooperation. Mark Barenberg, The PoliticalEconomy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1456 (1993).
344. The National Labor Relations Board Region 20 is investigating Uber for unfair labor practices
committed across the country that are related to the misclassification of workers as independent
contractors. It has sued Uber requiring obedience in the investigation. N.L.R.B. v. Uber Technologies,
No: 3:16-MC-80057 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,2016).
345. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA expressly prohibits employers from "dominat[ing] or interfer[ing]
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribut[ing] financial or other support
to it." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1974). Further, Section 2(5) of the NLRA extends the definition of "labor
organization" to "any organization of any kind . .. in which employees participate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concernmg grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1978).
346. For example, I currently am studying the collective organizing of Uber drivers who formed the
San Francisco Bay Area Drivers' Association-a worker association that is unaffiliated with any union or
established alt-labor group. See supranote 10.
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What are the political and economic ramifications of the resurrection of
precarious chauffeur work and the restricted ability to advocate on behalf of
workers? To the extent that secure work has been the hallmark of realized
citizenship in the long history of paid work, I close this Article by suggesting
that the contemporary rise of precarity undermines not just the ability of large
groups of workers to earn their livings-but perhaps more insidiously, it
corrodes the political process. Despite the enduring ideological belief in the
promise of work for individual and societal betterment, the political and
economic insecurities epitomized by modem day chauffeur work undermine
this promise. While prior to the late 1970s, workers had a political voice
through organized labor, that possibility has been increasingly faint with
decisions by some unions in the Uber-era to forego the fight for collective
bargaining and by lawmakers to deregulate the industry. Many chauffeur
drivers in San Francisco's taxi and Uber economies who lack strong
representation and no enforceable protections work long hours only to end
their day with less than subsistence wages, or even worse, in debt. Such
workers34 7 are being systematically carved out of the political process. This,
I conclude, is a crisis not only for workers but also for the possibilities of
democratic politics.3 4 8
With so much at stake, the question of what is to be done remains. My
hope is that the political history of chauffeur work detailed in this Article
may inform the contemporary struggle against precarity. Despite the gauze
of innovation and technology, chauffeur work has not changed over the last
one hundred years. Qualitatively, taxi work and Uber work are one and the
same. And yet, regulators and (some) labor advocates have approached them
differently-conceptualizing Uber work as something new-representing
the future of work in low-income sectors. In this context, I suggest that a
look to the past may be useful. To reverse the processes of precarity, we may
find guidance in a close examination of the early twentieth-century
production of secure chauffeur work via militant labor organizing, the
collective bargain for the social good, and strong industry regulations.

347.
348.

In San Francisco, this is a majority-immigrant workforce. See supra note 10.
For much of the U.S.'s modem history, the right to work (alongside the right to vote) has been

the hallmark of realized citizenship, understood as necessary for full participation in the body politic.
Political theorists have long maintained that without access to paid work, democratic participation is
impossible. Alice Kessler-Harris, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001). As philosopher Judith Shklar famously
wrote, "We are citizens only if we 'earn."' Judith N. Shklar, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION 67 (1991). This is especially true in the United States, where entitlements that are elsewhere

universal, such as the right to an old age pension, to unemployment insurance, and to health insurance,
are tied either to employment or to an individual's record of employment. Kessler-Harris at 4-6.
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